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1 
THE EROSION OF THE RULE OF LAW WHEN A STATE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL REFUSES TO DEFEND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CONTROVERSIAL LAWS 
Rena M. Lindevaldsen* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell v. 
Hodges,1 declared that it was unconstitutional for states to continue to define 
marriage as the union of one man and one woman.2 Although there is much to be 
written on concerning the decision in Obergefell, including the strength of the legal 
analysis and the sharp division among the bench on the issues presented, this article 
will focus on one aspect of the marriage litigation that ultimately culminated in the 
Obergefell decision declaring a right to same-sex marriage—namely, the refusal of 
several state attorneys general to defend the marriage laws and amendments in their 
states. Although the Supreme Court has issued its decision on the marriage question, 
the broader questions of whether an attorney general can refuse to defend the 
constitutionality of a law and whether the people have recourse under those 
circumstances present ongoing issues that strike at the core of a government system 
based on separation of powers and the rule of law. 
In the past few years, more than one-third of the state attorneys general faced the 
question of whether to defend the state marriage laws.3 In February 2014, United 
States Attorney General Eric Holder added fuel to the ongoing controversy by 
encouraging state attorneys general to refuse to defend any laws they believed were 
unconstitutionally discriminatory.4 In response, the state attorneys general took 
different approaches to their duty to defend.5 
The Kentucky, Florida, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Virginia attorneys general 
exemplify the various responses to federal litigation challenging state marriage laws. 
 ________________________  
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. J.D., 
magna cum laude, Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank research assistants Alexis Johnson and 
Alexandra Hubbard for their assistance with this article. 
 1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2608.  
 3. See, e.g., Edith Honan, State Attorneys General Forced into Spotlight on Marriage Debate, REUTERS 
(June 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-usa-gaymarriage-attorneysgeneral-
idUSKBN0ED22D20140602 (discussing 12 cases filed in recent months); Austin Nimocks, History and Recent 
Developments in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (May 28, 2014), http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/history-and-recent-development-in-same-sex-marriage-litigation (discussing and listing 
the various pending cases). 
 4. See Matt Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/us/holder-says-state-attorneys-general-dont-have-to-defend-gay-marriage-
bans.html. 
 5. See id. 
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The Kentucky attorney general defended the marriage amendment at the trial court 
but then refused to file an appeal after the marriage laws were declared 
unconstitutional.6 In a public statement, he said that part of his decision rested on 
how he would be remembered in history: “I have a strong sense of where I think this 
issue is headed.”7 After he refused to file an appeal, the governor then hired outside 
counsel to continue the defense.8 The Kentucky case was one of the four consolidated 
cases before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that led to the 
Obergefell decision.9 
The Florida attorney general said that regardless of her personal opinions (which 
went undeclared), she had a duty to defend the law.10 The defense offered by the 
attorney general’s office, however, was wanting. The attorney for the state argued 
for approximately five minutes, which represented only a small portion of the 
allotted time.11 During the argument, the attorney general’s office argued only that 
Baker v. Nelson controlled and, therefore, that the court should not even reach the 
merits of the case.12 The Florida attorney general’s office did not offer any oral 
 ________________________  
 6. See Laura Clawson, Kentucky Attorney General Says He Won’t Appeal Marriage Ruling, Governor Says 
Not So Fast, DAILY KOS (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/03/04/1282019/-Kentucky-governor-
appealing-marriage-ruling-after-attorney-general-refuses-to-nbsp-appeal.  
 7. Honan, supra note 3. 
 8. The governor ultimately hired a private law firm, with no prior marriage litigation experience, to handle 
the appeal. See Brett Snider, Private Firm to Be Paid $100K to Defend Ky. Gay Marriage Ban, FINDLAW (Mar. 18, 
2014), http://blogs.findlaw.com/sixth_circuit/2014/03/private-firm-to-be-paid-100k-to-defend-ky-gay-marriage-
ban.html.  
 9. The Sixth Circuit decision specifically mentioned the different paths each marriage case took to reach a 
decision: 
Since 2003, nineteen States and the District of Columbia have expanded the definition of 
marriage to include gay couples, some through state legislation, some through initiatives of 
the people, some through state court decisions, and some through the actions of state 
governors and attorneys general who opted not to appeal adverse court decisions. 
DeBoer v. Syder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 10. See Matt Galka, Florida’s Attorney General Upsets Advocates of Same-Sex Marriage, NEWS4JAX (June 
5, 2014), http://www.news4jax.com/news/floridas-attorney-general-upsets-advocates-of-samesex-
marriage/26350666. 
 11. See Timothy Kincaid, Florida Marriage Ban Ruled Unconstitutional, BOX TURTLE BULL. (July 17, 
2014), http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/tag/florida.  
 12. See Huntsman v. Heavilin, No. 2014-CA-0305-K, slip op. at 4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2014), available at 
http://static.lgbtqnation.com/assets/2014/07/Huntsman-Florida-marriage-decision.pdf (Florida attorney general 
arguing Baker v. Nelson controlled thus warranting dismissal). Baker v. Nelson is a 1972 order from the Supreme 
Court of the United States that dismissed for want of a substantial federal question a due process and equal protection 
challenge to Minnesota’s marriage laws. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Such a dismissal had a binding 
effect. Although this author agrees that Baker should control, most federal courts in the year or two before the oral 
arguments in the Florida marriage case had rejected the argument. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1208 
(10th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e think it is clear that doctrinal developments foreclose the conclusion that the issue is, as 
Baker determined, wholly insubstantial.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 
169, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (“These doctrinal changes constitute another reason why Baker does not foreclose our 
disposition of this case.”), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 988–92 (W.D. Wis. 
2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 418–21 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 
1128, 1133 n. 1 (D. Or. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1066–67 (D. Idaho 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, 
973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 774 n. 6 (E.D. Mich. 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 648–49 (W.D. Tex. 2014); 
Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (E.D. Va. 2014); McGee v. Cole, 993 F. Supp. 2d 639, 651–52 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2014); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 2014). But see DeBoer, 
772 F.3d at 401–02: 
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argument that substantively defended the marriage amendment that had been passed 
with 61.9% of the voters in Florida in 2008.13 
The Pennsylvania litigation presents another approach. From the outset, 
Attorney General Kathleen Kane refused to defend the law.14 She stated that, “I 
cannot ethically defend the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s version of DOMA 
where I believe it to be wholly unconstitutional . . . . [I]t is a lawyer’s ethical 
obligation under Pennsylvania’s Rules of Professional Conduct to withdraw from a 
case in which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client . . . .”15 As 
a result, in the trial court, the governor’s office represented the state’s interests.16  
After the trial court declared the marriage amendment to be unconstitutional, the 
governor abandoned the defense and refused to file an appeal.17 In an effort to 
maintain an appeal from the decision, a clerk who is responsible for issuing marriage 
licenses attempted to intervene.18 The court denied the motion to intervene, 
explaining that “[i]f the highest elected official in the commonwealth chooses to 
abide by our decision, it defies credulity that we would permit a single citizen to 
stand in for him to perfect an appeal . . . .”19 The judge further explained his belief 
that “[a]t bottom, we have before us a contrived legal argument by a private citizen 
 ________________________  
In the end, neither of the two preconditions for ignoring Supreme Court precedent applies 
here. Windsor as shown does not mention Baker, and it clarifies that its ‘opinion and holding’ 
do not govern the States’ authority to define marriage. Hollingsworth was dismissed. And 
neither Lawrence nor Romer mentions Baker, and neither is inconsistent with its outcome. 
Id. 
 Federal circuit court decisions after the oral arguments in the Florida case continued to conclude that Baker was 
not controlling. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 466 (9th Cir. 2014) (“However, ‘subsequent decisions of the 
Supreme Court’ not only ‘suggest’ but make clear that the claims before us present substantial federal questions.”), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (2015); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1079 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson . . . is not controlling . . . .”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); 
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s apparent abandonment of 
Baker and the significant doctrinal developments that occurred after the Court issued its summary dismissal in that 
case, we decline to view Baker as binding precedent . . . .”), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 
(2014). 
 Thus, the attorney general’s office should have offered argument that addressed the substantive merits as well as 
a procedural defect that arguably precluded the court from properly deciding the case on a motion for summary 
judgment. Cf. Transcript of Proceedings of Oral Argument at 29–57, Huntsman v. Heavilin, No. 2014-CA-0305-K, 
slip op. at 4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2014) (arguments offered by amicus curiae in support of the State of Florida). In 
contrast to the six transcript pages of oral argument by the Attorney General’s office, amicus Liberty Counsel 
advanced procedural and substantive defenses of the marriage laws representing twenty-eight pages of transcript. 
Id. 




 14. See Press Release, Attorney General Kane Will Not Defend DOMA, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney 
General (July 11, 2013), available at https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/Media_and_Resources/Press_Releases/Press 
_Release /?pid=913#. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Sophia Pearson, Pennsylvania County Official Can’t Appeal on Gay-Marriage, BLOOMBERG (June 
18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-18/pennsylvania-county-official-can-t-appeal-on-gay-
marriage.html. 
 17. See id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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who seeks to accomplish what the chief executive of the commonwealth, in his 
wisdom, has declined to do.”20 One reporter aptly summarized the ultimate effect of 
the governor’s refusal to file an appeal: “Governor Tom Corbett effectively legalized 
gay marriage by declining to appeal a state court ruling that a ban was 
unconstitutional.”21  
The Wisconsin attorney general represents the straightforward undertaking to 
defend the marriage amendment. “This constitutional amendment was approved by 
a large majority of Wisconsin residents. I believe the amendment is constitutional, 
and I will vigorously defend it . . . .”22 Finally, and in direct contrast to the approach 
of the Wisconsin attorney general, the Virginia attorney general not only refused to 
defend the marriage amendment that was passed by fifty-seven percent of the voters 
in 2006, but he actively litigated against the law.23 
The response by those who support same-sex marriage to these attorney general 
decisions has been mixed.24 A representative of Equality Florida faulted the Florida 
attorney general for following the law rather than the personal interests at stake.25 
On the other hand, Suzanne Goldberg of Columbia University’s Center for Gender 
and Sexuality Law, a long-time advocate of same-sex marriage, said the usual 
approach of attorneys general is to defend the law—it is in their “job description.”26  
For those who support the marriage amendments, they have characterized some 
of these situations as “collusive.”27 The main point of contention is that when the 
state refuses to defend, defends half-heartedly, or joins with plaintiffs in arguing 
against the constitutionality of a duly enacted law, then there is no meaningful 
litigation of the issue or defense of the interests of the electorate. 
Putting aside the controversial context from which the current duty to defend 
question arises—whether same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marriage—
the straightforward question presented is whether a state attorney general has a duty 
to defend duly enacted state laws or state constitutional amendments when the 
attorney general personally believes the law is unconstitutional. How the question is 
answered implicates several foundational principles: 
(1) separation of powers (and the proper balance of powers between 
the branches); 
 ________________________  
 20. Id. 
 21. Honan, supra note 3.  
 22. Patrick Marley, ACLU Lawsuit Challenges Wisconsin Same-Sex Marriage Ban, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. 
SENTINEL (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/aclu-lawsuit-challenges-wisconsin-same-sex-
marriage-ban-b99197217z1-243352101.html. 
 23. See Tal Kopan, Herring Explains Gay Marriage Shift, POLITICO (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/virginia-gay-marriage-mark-herring-102508#ixzz3ncerxtB1. 
 24. See Galka, supra note 10 (arguing attorneys general should consider the personal interests of those in 
same-sex relationships before defending a law based on politics, rather than people). But see Honan, supra note 3 
(arguing regardless of their personal feelings, it is an attorney general’s job to defend duly enacted laws and to allow 
the courts to decide what is constitutional). 
 25. See Galka, supra note 10. 
 26. Honan, supra note 3. 
 27. Jeff Mapes, Gay Marriage: U.S. Supreme Court Should Stay Out of Oregon Case, Attorney General 
Says, OREGONLIVE, (June 2, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/index.ssf/2014/06/gay_marriage_us_ 
supreme _ court.html.  
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(2) the rule of law (including the need for consistency and 
predictability); 
(3) the fact that public officials are servants of the people and not 
the masters of the laws (they are subject to the law, not above the 
law); and 
(4) protecting the integrity of our legal system (with unique issues 
arising when an attorney general joins the plaintiffs in challenging 
the constitutionality of state laws). 
Although prosecutors have long held the discretion to refuse to enforce a law 
(subject to constitutional limitations), the refusal to defend a law (in response to a 
lawsuit)28 implicates greater concerns than the refusal to enforce a law for at least 
two reasons. First, if an executive refuses to enforce a law, a subsequent 
administration can change course and decide to enforce it. When, however, an 
executive refuses to defend the law in ongoing litigation (and possibly actively 
litigating against the constitutionality of the law), any decision of unconstitutionality 
is binding on subsequent administrations and the electorate.29 In other words, under 
those circumstances, there is no law for a subsequent executive to decide whether to 
enforce.  
Second, the refusal to defend a law in ongoing litigation raises separation of 
power concerns. If an attorney general refuses to defend the law, depending on state 
and federal standing jurisprudence, there may be no one able to represent the will of 
the electorate in the litigation.30 Under those circumstances, the attorney general 
essentially exercises a veto or suspension power over duly enacted laws. 
Additionally, when the chief law enforcement official, whose duty it is to defend the 
laws, refuses to defend a law or decides to join sides with the opposing party, the 
attorney general undermines public confidence in our legal system. 
In this article, I focus on the duty of state attorneys general to defend laws with 
which they personally disagree. Part I of this article discusses two United States 
Supreme Court cases that laid the groundwork for the increased number of state 
attorneys general refusing to defend state laws. It also explores the various ways in 
which state attorneys general have handled litigation over the right to same-sex 
marriage when those attorneys general disagreed with the existing laws. Part II of 
this article discusses the legal duty of state attorneys general to defend the law and 
then explores the longstanding historical exceptions to that duty. Part III highlights 
the legal and political difficulties presented when a state attorney general refuses to 
defend the law based on personal beliefs of unconstitutionality. Finally, Part IV 
presents a viable approach to those situations where a state attorney general believes 
the law is unconstitutional, balancing the right of the people to have their laws 
defended in court with the attorney general’s strong personal beliefs that prevent him 
from carrying out his duties. 
 ________________________  
 28. See, e.g., Curt A. Levey & Kenneth A. Klukowski, Take Care Now: Stare Decisis and the President’s 
Duty to Defend Acts of Congress, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 380–91 (2014). 
 29. In a recent article, authors Curt Levey and Ken Klukowski explained that if the executive branch fails to 
defend a statute, resulting in it being struck down, that precedent could tie the hands of a future executive. See id. 
 30. See id. at 420. 
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I.  RECENT PRECEDENT ON THE DUTY TO DEFEND 
A. United States v. Windsor: The President and Attorney General Refused 
to Defend the Federal Defense of Marriage Act31 
In Windsor, two women, who were New York residents, married in Canada in 
2007.32 When Ms. Spyer died, Ms. Windsor sought to claim the federal estate tax 
exemption that is available for surviving spouses.33 After Windsor paid the $363,053 
estate tax, she sought a refund.34 The Internal Revenue Service denied the exemption 
because section 3 of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined 
marriage, for purposes of all federal statutes, regulations, and rulings, as the union 
of one man and one woman.35  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus 
and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only 
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife.36 
Thus, Windsor was not a surviving spouse.  
Windsor filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in November 2010, claiming that DOMA violated the guarantee of equal 
protection.37 On February 23, 2011, while the tax refund suit was pending in the 
district court, United States Attorney General Eric Holder notified the speaker of the 
House of Representatives that “the President and I have concluded that 
classifications based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and that, as 
applied to same-sex couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is 
unconstitutional.”38  
In that letter, Attorney General Holder admitted that “[t]he Supreme Court has 
yet to rule on the appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual 
orientation.”39 The letter stated, however, that the Supreme Court has “rendered a 
number of decisions that set forth the criteria that should inform this and any other 
judgment as to whether heightened scrutiny applies . . . .”40 The letter set forth an 
independent analysis of each of those factors and reached a decision that neither the 
Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court had reached at the time—that sexual 
 ________________________  
 31. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013).  
 32. See id. at 2682.  
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. at 2683. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996). 
 37. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 38. Letter from Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, 
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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orientation should be considered a suspect classification.41 Applying heightened 
scrutiny, the letter concluded that DOMA is unconstitutional.42  
The attorney general notified the speaker that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 530D, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) would no longer defend DOMA.43 That statute provides 
that the attorney general:  
shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the 
Attorney General . . . determines . . . to refrain (on the grounds that 
the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any 
judicial, administrative or other proceeding, the constitutionality of 
any provision of any Federal statute . . . or not to appeal or request 
review of any judicial, administrative or other determination 
adversely affecting the constitutionality of any such provision . . . 
.44  
In Windsor, the Supreme Court mentioned that the § 530D letter in that case was 
unique because it had been issued before any adverse judgment against the law.45 In 
the past, the DOJ had submitted § 530D letters after a court had already ruled against 
the government.46  
This case is unusual, however, because the § 530D letter was not 
preceded by an adverse judgment. The letter instead reflected the 
Executive’s own conclusion, relying on a definition still being 
debated and considered in the courts, that heightened equal 
protection scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of 
sexual orientation.47 
Section 530D also mentions that the attorney general must submit the report 
“within such time as will reasonably enable the House of Representatives and the 
Senate to take action, separately or jointly, to intervene in timely fashion in the 
proceeding, but in no event later than 30 days after the making of each determination 
. . . .”48 Pursuant to House Rule II.8, the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(BLAG) voted three to two to intervene in the litigation to defend DOMA.49 The 
district court granted the BLAG’s motion to intervene in the case.50  
 ________________________  
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Letter from Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, (Feb. 23, 2011). 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B) (2002). 
 45. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
 
 46. See id. at 2683. 
 47. See id. at 2683–84.  
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(2). 
 49. See Molly K. Hooper, House Leaders Vote to Intervene in DOMA Defense, HILL (Mar. 9, 2011), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/148521-house-leaders-vote-to-intervene-in-doma-defense. 
 50. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.  
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Despite the fact that DOMA had been enacted in 1996 with wide, bi-partisan 
support, and signed into law by President Clinton,51 there was significant public 
criticism of the BLAG’s decision to use funds to defend the law.52 If the BLAG had 
not voted to defend the law, however, the litigation would have continued in the trial 
court with no real defense.53 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted 
summary judgment for the plaintiff.54 Both the DOJ and the BLAG filed notices of 
appeal.55 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.56 The 
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari review and instructed the 
parties to address two additional questions: (1) “whether the United States’ 
agreement with Windsor’s legal position precludes further review” and (2) “whether 
BLAG has standing to appeal the case.”57 Because all parties agreed that the Court 
had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under those circumstances, the Court appointed 
another attorney, as amicus curiae, to argue the position that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction.58 
The Supreme Court concluded that the United States retained a sufficient stake 
in the litigation to satisfy Article III jurisdiction.59 Specifically, even though the 
executive agreed with Windsor’s legal argument, the United States had continued to 
refuse to refund the estate taxes sought by Windsor.60 Thus, Windsor had been denied 
the tax relief she sought.61 In addition to the Article III requirements, the Court 
explained that “prudential considerations demand that the Court insist upon “that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”62 That 
requirement can be satisfied even where the named parties do not themselves present 
the adverseness.63 According to the Court in Windsor, the presence of the BLAG and 
 ________________________  
 51. H.R. 3396 (104th): Defense of Marriage Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/104-
1996/h316 (passed by seventy-nine percent of the House) (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); H.R. 3396 (104th): Defense 
of Marriage Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/104-1996/s280 (passed by eighty-nine 
percent of the Senate) (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
 52. See Andrew Rosenthal, G.O.P. Wastes Taxpayer Dollars, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Jan. 15, 
2003), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/g-o-p-wastes-taxpayer-dollars/ (“[T]hey seem to relish 
spending taxpayer dollars on the plainly unconstitutional Defense of Marriage Act.”); Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, 
Pelosi Statement on Speaker Boehner’s Waste of $1.5 Million in Taxpayer Dollars Defending DOMA (Oct. 16, 
2012), available at http://www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/pelosi-statement-speaker-boehners-waste-1-5-
million-taxpayer-dollars-defending-doma/. 
 53. See discussion infra Part III (finding the constitutionality of a duly enacted law should not be decided on 
a default when the only basis for refusing to defend is an official’s personal belief that the law is unconstitutional).  
 54. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 55. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 56. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 57. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 2686. 
 60. Id. Although not an issue in Windsor, if the United States had granted her refund, contrary to the law, 
arguably no one would have had standing to litigate the constitutionality of DOMA. In addition, the executive branch 
would have unilaterally effected a change in the law through an unconstitutional suspension of the law. See 
discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 61. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686. 
 62. Id. at 2680, 2687 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
 63. See id. at 2687. 
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other amicus curiae prepared to defend the constitutionality of DOMA was sufficient 
to satisfy the prudential concern with adverseness.64  
In concluding that it had Article III standing, the Court considered the fact that 
if it dismissed the case, other litigation would ensue across the country raising the 
exact issue.65 In the meantime, the “[r]ights and privileges of hundreds of thousands 
of persons would be adversely affected, pending a case in which all prudential 
concerns about justiciability are absent.”66 Thus, despite the DOJ’s refusal to defend 
the law, the Court found that the Article III requirements were satisfied and 
prudential concerns warranted a conclusion that the Court had jurisdiction to hear 
the case.67 
The Court did express concern, however, over the “Executive’s failure to defend 
an Act of Congress based on a constitutional theory not yet established in judicial 
decisions[.]”68  
[I]f the Executive’s agreement with a plaintiff that a law is 
unconstitutional is enough to preclude judicial review, then the 
Supreme Court’s primary role in determining the constitutionality 
of a law . . . would become only secondary to the President’s. This 
would undermine the clear dictate of the separation-of-powers 
principle that “when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with 
the Constitution, ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.” Similarly, with respect 
to the legislative power, when Congress has passed a statute and a 
President has signed it, it poses grave challenges to the separation 
of powers for the Executive at a particular moment to be able to 
nullify Congress’ enactment solely on its own initiative and without 
any determination from the Court.69 
Although the Court acknowledged the “difficult choice” that an executive faces 
when he personally believes a statute is unconstitutional,70 the Court explained that  
there is no suggestion here that it is appropriate for the Executive as 
a matter of course to challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather 
than making the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal. 
The integrity of the political process would be at risk if difficult 
 ________________________  
 64. See id. at 2688. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.   
 67. See id. As a result, the Court did not reach the question of whether the BLAG had standing to appeal the 
District Court’s decision. Id. at 2689. 
 68. Id. at 2688. 
 69. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427–28 (2012)). 
 70. Id. at 2689. 
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constitutional issues were simply referred to the Court as a routine 
exercise.71  
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, took the position 
in a dissenting opinion that the Court should have dismissed the case for lack of 
Article III standing because the plaintiffs and the government “agree entirely on what 
should happen in this lawsuit.”72 He essentially characterized the majority opinion 
as a “jaw-dropping” power-grab—the “assertion of judicial supremacy over the 
people’s Representatives in Congress and the Executive.”73 Justice Scalia explained 
that when the parties are not adverse, and agree on the appropriate outcome, the 
Court is stripped of the jurisdiction to hear the case.74 “Article III requires not just a 
plaintiff (or appellant) who has standing to complain but an opposing party who 
denies the validity of the complaint.”75 In Windsor, the government did not deny the 
validity of plaintiff’s claims.76 
Justice Scalia believes that the only recourse in a situation where the executive 
agrees with the plaintiff, and thus refuses to defend the constitutionality of the law, 
is political.77  
If majorities in both Houses of Congress care enough about the 
matter, they have available innumerable ways to compel executive 
action without a lawsuit—from refusing to confirm Presidential 
appointees to the elimination of funding. (Nothing says “enforce the 
Act” quite like “. . . or you will have money for little else.”) But the 
condition is crucial; Congress must care enough to act against the 
President itself, not merely enough to instruct its lawyers to ask us 
to do so. Placing the Constitution’s entirely anticipated political arm 
wrestling into permanent judicial receivership does not do the 
system a favor. And by the way, if the President loses the lawsuit 
but does not faithfully implement the Court’s decree, just as he did 
not faithfully implement Congress’s statute, what then? Only 
Congress can bring him to heel by . . . what do you think? Yes: a 
direct confrontation with the President.78 
 ________________________  
 71. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 72. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2699–2700 (“In the more than two centuries that this Court has existed as an institution, we have 
never suggested that we have the power to decide a question when every party agrees with both its nominal opponent 
and the court below on that question’s answer.”). 
 75. Id. at 2701. 
 76. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687. 
 77. See id., at 2698, 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 78. Id. at 2704–05. If each branch were fulfilling its obligation to jealously guard against encroachments by 
another branch, it would correct the situation raised when attorneys general refused to defend a law. James Madison 
explained in Federalist No. 51 that “the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.” In a broken system, however, where each branch 
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Relying on prior United States Supreme Court precedent, Justice Alito agreed 
that the BLAG has Article III standing to defend the constitutionality of a statute 
when the executive declines to defend the act.79 In INS v. Chadha,80 the Supreme 
Court explained that it had “long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the 
validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with 
enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or 
unconstitutional.”81 
B. Hollingsworth v. Perry: The California Attorney General Refused to 
Defend Proposition 882 
In August 2004, six months after San Francisco had begun issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples because the mayor and other municipal officials had 
concluded that the marriage laws were unconstitutional,83 the Supreme Court of 
California held that “city officials had no authority to refuse to perform their 
ministerial duty in conformity with the current California marriage statutes on the 
basis of their view that the statutory limitation of marriage to a couple comprised of 
a man and a woman is unconstitutional.”84 The Supreme Court of California 
specifically rejected the city’s argument that officials could refuse to enforce the law 
when they believed it was necessary to protect the rights of minorities.85  
In this case, the city has suggested that a contrary rule—one under 
which a public official charged with a ministerial duty would be free 
to make up his or her own mind whether a statute is constitutional 
and whether it must be obeyed—is necessary to protect the rights of 
minorities. But history demonstrates that members of minority 
groups, as well as individuals who are unpopular or powerless, have 
the most to lose when the rule of law is abandoned—even for what 
appears, to the person departing from the law, to be a just end. As 
observed at the outset of this opinion, granting every public official 
the authority to disregard a ministerial statutory duty on the basis of 
the official’s opinion that the statute is unconstitutional would be 
fundamentally inconsistent with our political system’s commitment 
to John Adams’ vision of a government where official action is 
 ________________________  
tolerates substantial encroachments and the citizenry do not realize the threat to liberty from such encroachment, the 
presumed recourse envisioned by our founders becomes a nullity. 
 79. Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 80. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 81. Id. at 940. 
 82. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013). 
 83. See Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 464–65 (Cal. 2004).  
 84. Id. at 488 (stating city officials in San Francisco issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples for nearly 
one month before the Supreme Court of California granted a stay).  
 85. See id. at 499. 
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determined not by the opinion of an individual officeholder—but by 
the rule of law.86  
In 2008, in subsequent litigation over the marriage laws, the Supreme Court of 
California held that defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman violated 
the equal protection clause of the California Constitution.87 Later that year, 
California voters passed a ballot initiative (Proposition 8) that amended the 
California Constitution to provide that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman 
is valid or recognized in California.”88 The text of the amendment was identical in 
wording to the law that had been struck down in 2008 by the Supreme Court of 
California.89 A lawsuit was immediately filed challenging the constitutionality 
(under the California Constitution) of the marriage amendment.90  
In 2009, the Supreme Court of California rejected the argument that California 
voters lacked the authority to amend the constitution to define marriage as the union 
of one man and one woman.91 The litigation then headed to federal court, with 
plaintiffs challenging the amendment as an unconstitutional deprivation of equal 
protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.92 Except for the attorney general, who took the position that 
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, the remaining governmental defendants “refused 
to take a position on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and declined to defend 
Proposition 8.”93 As a result, the district court granted intervention to the official 
ballot proponents of Proposition 8 to defend the constitutionality of the law.94 In its 
August 4, 2010 order, Judge Walker declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional under 
both clauses.95 The California officials chose not to appeal the decision.96 
The proponents (defendant-intervenors) took an appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.97 The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the 
Supreme Court of California to determine whether under California law the 
proponents of Proposition 8 (who had defended the amendment in the trial court) 
would have standing to pursue an appeal when the public officials charged with that 
duty had refused to do so.98 The Supreme Court of California answered the question 
in the affirmative.99   
 ________________________  
 86. Id. 
 87. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 88. See id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5).  
 89. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 128–29 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., concurring & dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 68. 
 91. Id. at 119. 
 92. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 93. Id. at 928. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1003. 
 96. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013). 
 97. Id.  
 98. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 99. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.  
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“In a postelection challenge to a voter-approved initiative measure, 
the official proponents of the initiative are authorized under 
California law to appear and assert the state’s interest in the 
initiative’s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the 
measure when the public officials who ordinarily defend the 
measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so.”100 
Relying on that answer to the certified question, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
petitioners had standing under federal law to defend Proposition 8.101 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that states have the prerogative to decide who may assert their 
interests.102 Thus, for purposes of standing, the federal court only needs to determine 
whether the state has suffered a harm sufficient to confer standing, and that the party 
seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction is authorized to represent the state’s 
interests.103 On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Proposition 8 violated 
the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.104  
The Supreme Court of United States granted proponents’ petition for certiorari 
review and directed the parties to also brief the question of “[w]hether petitioners 
have standing under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution in this case.”105 In a five to 
four decision, which was issued the same day as the Windsor opinion, the Supreme 
Court of United States held that the official proponents of Proposition 8 lacked 
Article III standing to appeal the judgment of the district court.106  
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that official proponents of a ballot 
measure have a particularized interest sufficient to create a controversy under Article 
III.107 Once Proposition 8 was approved, the Court explained, it became a duly 
enacted amendment and the proponents were simply “concerned bystanders.”108 
Similarly, the Court rejected the idea that the federal courts should rely on state law 
to determine whether Article III standing is satisfied.109 The Ninth Circuit decision 
was vacated with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.110  
 ________________________  
 100. Id. (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011)).  
 101. Id.  
 102. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1014. 
 103. See id. at 1014–15. 
 104. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.  
 105. Id. at 2661. 
 106. See id. at 2657, 2668; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 107. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2667. 
 110. See id. at 2668. In light of the Supreme Court’s instructions to vacate the Ninth Circuit decision, questions 
arose concerning the validity of the district court decision. To the extent the official ballot proponents did not have 
an interest sufficient enough to satisfy Article III standing for purposes of appeal, then on what basis did they have 
standing to litigate the case in the federal trial court? Although the state defendants filed answers in Perry, and thus 
arguably demonstrated participation in the litigation, the trial court explained that the attorney general took the 
position that the marriage amendment was unconstitutional while the remaining government defendants refused to 
take a position on the constitutionality of the law and refused to defend it. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Even if the answers that were filed and the subsequent refusal to participate in 
litigation were sufficient to satisfy Article III standing for the trial court litigation, once the Supreme Court vacated 
the Ninth Circuit decision, all that remained was a decision from the Northern District of California. Absent the 
immediate directive from Governor Brown for the clerks to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples across the 
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Justice Kennedy, who authored the majority decision in Windsor, wrote a dissent 
in Hollingsworth that highlighted the irony of the majority’s decision that the people 
who passed the amendment lacked standing to defend it, particularly when the state 
specifically grants the proponents the right to defend it.111  
A prime purpose of justiciability is to ensure vigorous advocacy, yet 
the Court insists upon litigation conducted by state officials whose 
preference is to lose the case. The doctrine is meant to ensure that 
courts are responsible and constrained in their power, but the 
Court’s opinion today means that a single district court can make a 
decision with far-reaching effects that cannot be reviewed.112  
. . . .  
. . . [T]he Court fails to grasp or accept . . . the basic premise of the 
initiative process. And it is this. The essence of democracy is that 
the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the 
government, not the other way around. Freedom resides first in the 
people without need of a grant from government.113  
Justices Alito, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined the opinion.114 
C. The Virginia Attorney General Refused to Defend the Marriage 
Amendment115 
The Virginia attorney general represents an executive who not only refused to 
defend an amendment, but who also actively litigated against the amendment’s 
constitutionality.116 In some states, the attorney general has defended the amendment 
at the trial court but then refused to take an appeal after the amendment was declared 
unconstitutional.117 In at least one of those instances, the governor then appointed 
 ________________________  
entire state, the decision itself technically only applied to those counties situated within the Northern District of 
California. See Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Directs California 
Department of Public Health to Notify Counties That Same-Sex Marriages Must Commence (June 28, 2013), 
available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18120. 
 111. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today concludes that this 
state-defined status and this state-conferred right fall short of meeting federal requirements because the proponents 
cannot point to a formal delegation of authority that tracks the requirements of the Restatement of Agency.”); United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
 112. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 2668.  
 115. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 388 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 116. Id.  
 117. See, e.g., Ed Vogel, Nevada Officials Won’t Defend Gay Marriage Ban, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Feb. 12, 
2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-officials-won-t-defend-gay-marriage-ban; Trip Gabriel, 
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outside counsel to represent the state’s interest in the amendment.118 In other states, 
the attorney general declined from the outset to defend the laws.119 In one, the 
attorney general defended the amendments regardless of her personal views.120 
Because the Virginia litigation provides the context to discuss a variety of issues that 
arise when an attorney general refuses to defend a law based only on personal beliefs 
of unconstitutionality, this article will focus on that litigation.  
On July 18, 2013, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking an order declaring 
Virginia’s marriage laws unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.121 Plaintiffs challenged both the definition of marriage as the union of 
one man and one woman and the non-recognition of same-sex marriages from other 
jurisdictions.122 In support of a motion for summary judgment, on September 30, 
2013, then-Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli submitted a memorandum on behalf of 
the State Registrar of Vital Records, Janet M. Rainey, that defended the 
constitutionality of the marriage laws.123 
On January 23, 2014, twelve days after taking office, Attorney General Herring 
filed a Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Janet M. Rainey.124 
The memorandum stated:  
[h]aving duly exercised his independent constitutional judgment, 
the Attorney General has concluded that Virginia’s laws denying the 
right to marry to same-sex couples violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Attorney 
General will not defend Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage, will 
argue for its being declared unconstitutional, and will work to ensure 
that both sides of the issue are responsibly and vigorously briefed 
 ________________________  
 118. See, e.g., Aaron Blake & Sean Sullivan, Kentucky Gov. Steve Beshear (D) Will Appeal Pro-Gay Marriage 
Ruling, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/04/kentucky-
wont-appeal-gay-marriage-ruling/?wprss=rss_politics&clsrd. 
 119. See e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Seven Attorneys General Won’t Defend Their Own State’s Gay-Marriage Bans, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/02/20/six-attorneys-general-
wont-defend-their-own-states-gay-marriage-bans/ (discussing how attorneys general in Oregon, Pennsylvania, and 
California have refused to defend from the outset of the litigation same-sex marriage bans, and how the Illinois 
attorney general sought to intervene in litigation concerning the constitutionality of the marriage laws so that her 
office could argue that the laws were unconstitutional). 
 120. See, e.g., Letitia Stein, Florida Attorney General Defends Gay Marriage Ban as Cities Fight 
Back, REUTERS (June 25, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/25/us-usa-florida-gaymarriage-idUSKBN
0F02WW20140625. 
 121. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 122. Id. at 464. 
 123. Memorandum of Defendant Janet M. Rainey in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 34–35, 
Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 2:13-cv-00395). 
 124. Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey at 1, Bostic v. 
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and argued to facilitate a decision on the merits, consistent with the 
rule of law.125  
On January 24, 2014, the attorney general filed a Status Report on Behalf of 
Defendant, in which he stated that the “case certainly could be decided without a 
hearing,” but that the court should proceed with the already-scheduled oral 
arguments on January 30.126 The report also answered the court’s question of 
“[w]hether, in light of the change of position by Rainey, any other parties or entities 
have grounds to present argument that the laws denying the right to marry to same-
sex couples should be construed as constitutional[.]”127  
After pointing out that two county clerks remained to defend the law (one who 
was named as a defendant and another who was granted intervention), the attorney 
general stated, that “[n]o one other than the Attorney General, however, has standing 
to present the Commonwealth’s legal position as to whether Virginia’s same-sex-
marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”128 He further explained that the 
attorney general is to provide all legal service in civil matters for the Commonwealth: 
“[p]ermitting any other official to speak for the State would lead to a ‘cacophony’ of 
voices that would undermine the Attorney General’s critical role in a system founded 
on the separation of powers . . . .”129 Thus, the Commonwealth did not defend its 
constitution in the federal litigation, although two clerks were in the case to present 
arguments in defense of the law.130 
On February 13, 2014, the district court issued its opinion that the marriage laws 
violated both the due process and equal protection guarantees.131 On July 28, 2014, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court 
decision.132 The Supreme Court denied certiorari review.133 
D. The Alabama Federal-State Conflict 
A related separation of powers issue that has surfaced during the marriage 
litigation arises out of federalism concerns. Specifically, even before the Supreme 
Court of the United States issued its decision in Obergefell, a federal–state conflict 
was brewing in Alabama. On January 23, 2015, Judge Granade of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama issued an opinion concluding 
that Alabama’s marriage laws, which defined marriage as the union of one man and 
 ________________________  
 125. Id. 
 126. Status Report on Behalf of Defendant Janet M. Rainey at 1, Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. 
Va. 2014) (No. 2:13-cv-00395). 
 127. Id. at 2. Interestingly, just a few years earlier, as a State Senator of Virginia, Mark Herring voted to pass 
the Virginia marriage amendment. Cf. Timothy Williams & Trip Gabriel, Virginia’s New Attorney General Opposes 
Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/new-virginia-attorney-
general-drops-defense-of-gay-marriage-ban.html. 
 128. Status Report on Behalf of Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 126, at 3. 
 129. Id. at 4. 
 130. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 369 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 131. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 132. Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 384. 
 133. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286, 286 (2014). 
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one woman, violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United 
States Constitution.134 The plaintiffs in that case were a same-sex couple, Cari Searcy 
and Kimberly McKeand, who were married under California law and who desired 
for Searcy to be able to adopt McKeand’s eight-year-old son under Alabama’s 
adoption code that permits a person to adopt her spouse’s child.135 The Probate Court 
of Mobile County denied the petition because Alabama law did not permit Searcy to 
be treated as a spouse to McKeand.136 
Judge Granade issued an “Order Clarifying Judgment” on January 28, 2015, to 
address statements made to the press by the Alabama Probate Judges Association 
indicating that despite the federal district court ruling, the probate judges were 
required to follow Alabama law, as written, and should refuse to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.137 Judge Granade’s order conceded that not all the 
probate judges were parties to the action, but took the position that as a result of the 
judge’s order, the “Constitution require[d] the Clerk to issue such licenses” to same-
sex couples.138 Judge Granade also cautioned the judges to remember that for those 
judges who refuse to follow the ruling, the judge could certify a class action or issue 
successive injunctions, and “allow successful plaintiffs to recover costs and 
attorney’s fees.”139 
On February 12, 2015, Judge Granade issued another opinion in a separate case 
that enjoined Judge Don Davis of the Mobile County Probate Court from refusing to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.140 That case involved four same-sex 
couples who were denied marriage licenses in Mobile County.141 The court 
concluded, again, that the marriage laws were unconstitutional and granted 
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief.142  
Less than a month later, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued its own opinion 
that temporarily enjoined every probate judge in the state from issuing any marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.143 The court explained that it took jurisdiction in the 
 ________________________  
 134. Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1290 (S.D. Ala. 2015). Two days later, the court issued a stay 
for fourteen days pending a request for a stay to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which the circuit court did 
not issue. See Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328825, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2015). On February 
9, 2015, the United States Supreme Court, over the dissent from Justices Thomas and Scalia, similarly declined to 
issue a stay. See Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940, 941 (2015). The dissent explained that it is common practice to 
grant stays pending appeal when laws are declared unconstitutional and that they would have “shown the people of 
Alabama they respect they deserve and preserved the status quo while the Court resolves this important constitutional 
question.” Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 135. Searcy, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 1286. 
 136. See id. Alabama’s laws both defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman but also prohibited 
recognition as valid any marriage by parties of the same-sex that occurred in another jurisdiction. Id. at 1286–87 
(citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03). 
 137. Order Clarifying Judgment at 2, Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2015), 
available at http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2015/01/254000010-1-14-cv-00208-65-Order-
Clarifying-Judgment.pdf. 
 138. Id. at 3. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1210 (S.D. Ala. 2015). 
 141. Id. at 1207.  
 142. Id. at 1209–10. 
 143. See Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015) 
(per curiam). 
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matter by exercising its “superintending control over inferior tribunals . . . .”144 The 
court acknowledged that such control should be exercised “only in extreme cases 
and under unusual circumstances” but that this situation satisfied those criteria.145 
Before explaining in detail the basis for its jurisdiction to hear the case, the standing 
of the parties, and the rationale of its decision, the court pointed out that it took action 
because it was one of those rare cases where, “[i]n the wake of the federal district 
court’s orders,” the attorney general had “refrained from fulfilling what would 
otherwise have been his customary role of providing advice and guidance to public 
officials, including probate judges, as to whether or how the duties under the law 
may have been altered by the federal district court’s decision.”146 
After discussing the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, the court reached the 
question of whether the relators had standing to maintain the action.147 The relators 
were two public policy organizations and a probate judge who sued in the name of 
the state.148 The respondents argued that the relators lacked standing because they 
had “no private interest or private right in the performance by Alabama’s probate 
judges of their duty to issue marriage licenses only in accordance with Alabama 
law.”149 The Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that the relators had standing 
under the public-interest exception because they “filed in the name of the State for 
the purpose of securing performance by public officials of a duty owed to the public, 
not in the name of a private party to enforce a private right or duty.”150 The relators 
did not seek to vindicate a private right, but rather sought “to uphold a State statute 
and to secure performance by respondents of a duty owed to the public.”151 Several 
other states also apply the public-interest exception where a plaintiff seeks to compel 
a public officer to perform a legal duty in which the public has an interest.152 In 
concluding that the relators had standing, the court stated that “[i]t could not be 
clearer that the public—the people of Alabama—have an interest in the respondents’ 
faithful compliance with Alabama’s marriage laws.”153 
Apart from jurisdiction and standing, the court also responded to the argument 
that the federal district court decision prevented the Supreme Court of Alabama from 
deciding whether the probate judges should comply with the federal court ruling and, 
thereby, issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.154 “In passing on federal 
constitutional questions, the state courts and the lower federal courts have the same 
 ________________________  
 144. Id. at *12 (citing P.V. Smith, Annotation, Superintending Control over Inferior Tribunals, 112 A.L.R. 
1351, 1373 (1938)). 
 145. Id. at *12. 
 146. Id. at *2. The court explained that “[c]onfusion reigns” and “[t]here is no order or uniformity of practice.” 
Id. at *8. 
 147. Id. at *14–15. 
 148. Ala. Policy Inst., 2015 WL 892752, at *1. 
 149. Id. at *15. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at *17–18 (discussing cases applying the exception under the laws of Arkansas, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, and 
West Virginia). 
 153. Ala. Policy Inst., 2015 WL 892752, at *21. 
 154. Id. at *26. 
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responsibility and occupy the same position; there is a parallelism but not 
paramountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the same reviewing authority of 
the Supreme Court.”155  
After reviewing the constitutionality of Alabama’s marriage laws, the court 
concluded that the laws were constitutional.156 As a result, the court explained that 
the “Alabama probate judges have a ministerial duty not to issue any marriage 
license contrary to this law.”157 The court enjoined probate judges from issuing 
marriage licenses “contrary to Alabama law as explained in this opinion.”158 
Approximately two months later, Judge Granade certified a plaintiff class and a 
defendant class in the federal court marriage litigation.159 In a separate decision on 
the same day, Judge Granade granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive 
relief, enjoining the defendant class from enforcing Alabama laws that prohibit or 
fail to recognize same-sex marriages.160 However, the court stayed its decision 
pending the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell.161 
After Obergefell, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued an order stating that 
probate judges do not have to comply with the Supreme Court decision.162 Judge 
Granade responded with an order stating that all probate judges must comply with 
the ruling.163 At least thirteen counties responded to the Supreme Court ruling by 
refusing to issue marriage licenses to any couples whatsoever.164 On January 6, 2016, 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama issued an administrative order 
stating that “the existing orders of the Alabama Supreme Court that Alabama probate 
judges have a ministerial duty not to issue any marriage license contrary to the 
Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment or the Alabama Marriage Protection Act 
remain in full force and effect.”165 Two federal prosecutors in Alabama issued a 
 ________________________  
 155. Id. at *27 (quoting United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075 (7th Cir. 1970)). See 
also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Supremacy Clause does not 
require state courts to follow rulings by federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law); ASARCO Inc. v. 
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[S]tate courts . . . possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, to render binding judicial decisions that rest on their interpretation of federal law.”). 
 156. Id. at *43. 
 157. See id.  
 158. See Ala. Policy Inst., 2015 WL 892752, at *43.  
 159. See Strawser v. Strange, 307 F.R.D. 604, 614 (S.D. Ala. 2015). 
 160. See Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449468, at *6 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2015).  
 161. Id. 
 162. Polly Mosendz, To Avoid Supreme Court Decision, Alabama Temporarily Bans Gay Marriage Licenses, 
NEWSWEEK, (Jun. 29, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/avoid-supreme-court-gay-marriage-decision-alabama-
temporarily-bans-gay-348366. 
 163. Alabama Judges Must Issue Gay Marriage Licenses if They Issue Straight Marriage Licenses, Court 
Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/07/alabama_judges_must_issue_gay. html. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Administrative Order, at 4 (Moore, C.J., Jan. 6, 2016), available at 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/roymoore-adminorder_jan6-2016.pdf. Chief Justice Moore relied on 
decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the United States District Court for the 
District of Kansas, which affirmed the basic principle that a court decision binds only those parties before it. Thus, 
following that logic, Chief Justice Moore concluded that Obergefell did not declare Alabama’s marriage laws 
unconstitutional. Id. 
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response, stating that the probate judges should ignore the January 6 administrative 
order.166 
II. AN ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DUTY TO DEFEND 
A central question in the marriage litigation was whether an attorney general 
could refuse to defend a law she personally believed to be unconstitutional.167 Given 
United States Attorney General Eric Holder’s admonition to state attorneys general 
to refuse to defend any law they believed to be unconstitutional168 and the large 
number of state attorneys general who subsequently refused to defend the marriage 
laws, it is realistic to believe that attorneys general in the future will similarly refuse 
to defend other laws with which they disagree.  
States vary in the discretion afforded to the attorney general to direct and control 
litigation, including when state laws are challenged.169 A recent, comprehensive 
review of the constitutional and statutory provisions concerning an attorney 
general’s duty to defend discussed the varying approaches.170  
Forty-three [state constitutions] clearly do not provide anything 
about whether the attorney general has a duty to defend (or 
concede). . . . Of the remaining seven constitutions, four specify that 
the attorney general is the “legal officer” of the state, and three 
declare that the attorney general – as the Texas Constitution puts it 
– “shall represent the State in all suits . . . in which the State may be 
a party.”171 
On the other hand, state statutes address the power and responsibilities of the 
attorneys general:  
Most state statutes provide that the attorney general is to represent 
(or appear on behalf of) the state or has a duty to represent it. As 
noted with respect to similar constitutional provisions, such 
language is rather equivocal because it is hard to tease out 
implications about when attorneys general may (or must) defend (or 
concede the invalidity of) state law. A handful of states have more 
specific directives. Two states mandate that their attorneys general 
defend the constitutionality of state law (Pennsylvania and 
Mississippi). Tennessee clearly empowers its attorney general to 
 ________________________  
 166. Michelle Gorman, Prosecutors Urge Alabama Judges to Issue Gay Marriage Licenses Despite Order 
from Top Justice, NEWSWEEK, (Jan. 7, 2016, 12:36 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/prosecutors-urge-alabama-
judges-issue-gay-marriage-licenses-despite-order-top-412783. 
 167. See Apuzzo, supra note 4. 
 168. Id.  
 169. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty 
Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2130 (2015).  
 170. See generally id. at 2157–77 (Appendix I to the article sets forth the statutory and constitutional 
provisions of each state concerning an attorney general’s duty to defend). 
 171. Id. at 2128. 
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refuse to defend laws she finds unconstitutional. Louisiana has a 
suggestive but ambiguous statute. It provides that the attorney 
general “at his discretion, shall represent . . . the state in any action 
or proceeding in which the constitutionality of a state statute or of a 
resolution of the legislature is challenged or assailed.” . . . By statute, 
Nebraska compels its attorney general to challenge the 
constitutionality of state law whenever two preconditions are 
satisfied: first, she has previously opined that the law is 
unconstitutional; and second, a state officer refuses to enforce the 
law in reliance on that opinion.172 
State laws also differ on the question of whether, and how, outside counsel can 
be hired to defend the constitutionality of a law.173 The various statutes, however, do 
not squarely address the scope of the duty to defend, including what arguments an 
attorney general must advance in litigation and whether an attorney general must 
take an appeal from an adverse trial court ruling.174 Whatever the answers to these 
questions, it is clear that the underlying question of whether an attorney general has 
a duty to defend is a pressing one, with attorneys general increasingly refusing to 
defend. Approximately “fifty-seven percent of state refusals to defend (twenty of 
thirty-five) have occurred since 2008, with same-sex marriage accounting for one-
third of all refusals.”175  
A. The Historical Roots of the Duty to Enforce and Defend 
The discussion of the duty to defend, as distinct from an executive’s duty to 
enforce, is a fairly recent phenomenon.176 Authors Curt Levey and Kenneth 
Klukowski explained that prior to 1980, the discussion in United States attorney 
general opinions focused only on the duty to enforce the law.177 In 1980, the 
executive’s “duty to defend” was the central focus in an opinion by the then-United 
States Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti.178 In that opinion, he wrote, “I concur 
fully in the view expressed by nearly all of my predecessors that when the Attorney 
General is confronted with such a choice, it is almost always the case that he can best 
discharge the responsibilities of his office by defending and enforcing the Act of 
Congress.”179 
The Declaration of Independence proclaims that all people are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights and that the purpose of civil government, 
which derives its powers from the people, is to secure those rights: 
 ________________________  
 172. Id. at 2130. 
 173. See Gregory F. Zoeller, Duty to Defend and the Rule of Law, 90 IND. L.J. 513, 552–53 (2015) (discussing 
state approaches to the hiring of outside counsel).  
 174. Devins & Prakash, supra note 169, at 2131. 
 175. See id. at 2178–87 (Appendix II to the Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General article describes each case 
the authors uncovered where an attorney general had refused to defend the constitutionality of a state law or 
constitutional provision). 
 176. See Levey & Klukowski, supra note 28, at 385. 
 177. See id. at 385–86. 
 178. See id. at 385. 
 179. Id.  
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
Pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to 
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such 
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness.180 
The United States Constitution similarly begins with a recognition that power 
resides in the people—“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”181 The Tenth 
Amendment then explains that all power resides in the people, except to the extent 
the people have delegated certain authority to the federal government or to the 
states.182 If a state were to attempt to exercise authority over an area of law that had 
been exclusively delegated in the Constitution to the federal government, the courts 
should declare the state law unconstitutional.183 Similarly, the Court should declare 
unconstitutional congressional acts that exceed their authority by infringing on the 
authority reserved by the states.184 However, the balance of powers between the three 
branches on the one hand, and between the state and federal governments on the 
other hand, has not been jealously guarded. This has led to an increasingly large 
scope of matters over which the federal government asserts jurisdiction.185 
 ________________________  
 180. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). See also 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (“Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain 
and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.”). 
 181. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 183. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). See also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 
1383 (2015) (“It is apparent that this Clause creates a rule of decision: Courts ‘shall’ regard the ‘Constitution,’ and 
all laws ‘made in Pursuance thereof,’ as ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’ They must not give effect to state laws that 
conflict with federal laws.”) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)); Hillsborough Cnty. v. 
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (“It is a familiar and well-established principle that the 
Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to,’ federal law.”) (citations omitted).  
 184. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional the Violence 
Against Women Act because Congress lacked authority to enact the law); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (declaring unconstitutional the Gun-Free School Zones Act because Congress lacked authority to enact the 
law). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“There is no position which depends on clearer 
principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is 
exercised, is void.”). 
 185. See Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, The United States of America: Washington is Expanding its 
Power by Turning State Governments into Instruments of Federal Policy, ATLANTIC (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/the-federal-takeover-of-state-governments/375270/. See also 
Charles R. Kesler, Separation of Powers and the Administrative State, in THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS: CRISIS IN THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 20, 23 (Gordon S. Jones & John A. Marini eds., 1988). 
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The separation of power provisions are designed to accomplish the purpose of 
government set forth in the Declaration of Independence—to secure the rights of the 
people.186 The question of whether an attorney general has a duty to defend laws 
enacted either through the elected representatives of the people or the people 
themselves (initiative power) must be informed by the fact that the people are the 
sovereign and the government officials the agents of the sovereign.187 Article I, 
section 2 of the Virginia Constitution states that “all power is vested in, and 
consequently derived from, the people,”188 and, as a result, “that magistrates are their 
trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.”189 When an attorney 
general refuses to defend a law, it directly disturbs the separation and balance of 
powers.  
The doctrine of separation of powers has long been rooted at the core of our 
nation’s system of government. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he 
principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the 
minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in 
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.”190 The Framers believed “[t]he accumulation 
of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, 
a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”191 Thus, to protect against the risk of 
tyranny, it is crucial that the established branches of government be separate and 
distinct from one another. In addition to deterring tyrannical rule, specific allocation 
of powers serves to create an “effective and accountable” national government.192 
Such precise delineation of responsibilities amongst branches enables citizens to 
identify who is responsible for making, or failing to make, various decisions.193   
 ________________________  
 186. See Kesler, supra note 185, at 25–26. See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
 187. See, e.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 51 (Va. 1793) (“Our government is declared to be founded 
on the authority of the people. The people, in convention, have ordered that a legislature shall be chosen, a governor 
and council shall be chosen, judges shall be appointed.--All these different characters are servants of the people, 
have different duties, and are amenable to them.”); Stephanie Hall Barclay, Retained by the People: Federalism, the 
Ultimate Sovereign, and Natural Limits on Government Power, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 257, 280 (2014) 
(“[G]overnments were created as agents of people and were entrusted with a limited portion of the people’s sovereign 
power.”); id. at 257 (“[T]he people—as a sovereign body separate and distinct from the states—were viewed by 
both the framers and states as the ultimate source and residuary location of sovereign power.”); id. at 268 (“[I]n our 
governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people.” (quoting JONATHAN ELLIOT, 
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 423, 432 (2d ed. 1891)); id. at 281 (“Patrick Henry of Virginia 
similarly explained that since the people have delegated power to the government, ‘[t]he governing persons are the 
servants of the people.’”); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (1993) (“American constitutional developments during the revolutionary period 
shifted sovereignty to the people, who select their representatives to exercise delegated sovereign authority.”); 
Stephen S. Trott, The Two-Sided Guarantee of Religious Freedom, Commencement Address: Albertson College, 46 
ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 34, 37 (Oct. 2003) (“This government is ours. The first three words in our Constitution are the 
most important: ‘We the People.’ We, as a united people, chose its guiding principles. Government does our 
bidding.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (“[W]e may define a republic to be . . . a government which 
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people . . . .”). 
 188. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976). 
 191. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47 
(James Madison)). 
 192. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).  
 193. Id. at 758. 
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Like most state constitutions,194 Article I, section 5 of the Virginia Constitution 
specifies that “the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the 
Commonwealth should be separate and distinct . . . .”195 The Virginia Constitution 
further emphasizes this concept in Article III, section 1 where it states that these 
“departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly 
belonging to the others, nor any person exercise the power of more than one of them 
at the same time.”196  
The separation of powers requirement is directly implicated where an attorney 
general refuses to defend a law based on personal preferences rather than on the plain 
language of the constitution. When an attorney general makes a policy determination 
that a law should be declared unconstitutional through non-defense based on 
personal beliefs or preferences, the executive is encroaching upon the powers 
delegated to the legislature (which is the branch charged with making policy 
determinations) or the judiciary.197 Under those circumstances, the attorney general 
is nullifying the will of the people.  
1. The Executive Branch Does Not Possess an Absolute Veto Power 
The expectation that the executive branch, which includes the attorney general, 
will defend and enforce laws arises in part from the rejection by the drafters of the 
 ________________________  
 194. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and 
judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted 
by this Constitution.”); GA. CONST. art I, § 2, para. 3 (“The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever 
remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions 
of either of the others except as herein provided.”); LA. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2 (“The powers of government of the 
state are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. . . . Except as otherwise provided 
by this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power 
belonging to either of the others.”); MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The powers of government shall be divided into 
three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one 
of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the 
instances expressly provided in this constitution.”); MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The power of the government of 
this state is divided into three distinct branches—legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons charged 
with the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch shall exercise any power properly belonging to either 
of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The 
legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct 
from each other.”); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The powers of the Government shall be divided into three distinct 
departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.”); TEX. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (“The powers of the Government 
of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate 
body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those 
which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall 
exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.”); 
W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so 
that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the 
powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the 
legislature.”). 
 195. VA. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 196. Id. art. III, § 1. 
 197. As discussed infra at Part IV.A, unless the law is a plain violation of the separation of powers or plainly 
contradicts the express terms of the written constitution, then the attorney general exceeds his authority in refusing 
to defend the law. Similarly, as discussed infra at Part III, even a decision by a higher court is not necessarily binding 
precedent. 
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Constitution of the absolute presidential veto in favor of a qualified veto power.198 
Unlike the English kings who had held the power of an absolute veto, the United 
States Constitution limits such power to a presidential veto, which Congress can 
override with a two-thirds vote, and the power to pardon certain crimes after 
conviction.199  
The first article of England’s 1689 Bill of Rights declared “[t]hat the pretended 
power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without 
consent of Parliament is illegal.”200 Subsequently, the power to suspend laws to avoid 
implementing a law that had been used for nearly 400 years prior to 1689 “was never 
again exercised by the English crown.”201 William Blackstone explained that 
[a]n act of parliament, thus made, is the exercise of the highest 
authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. . . . And it 
cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended, or repealed, 
but in the same forms, and by the same authority of parliament . . . 
It is true it was formerly held, that the king might in many cases, 
dispense with penal statutes: but now by statute . . . it is declared, 
that the suspending or dispensing with laws by regal authority, 
without consent of parliament, is illegal.202 
The United States Constitution includes at least three provisions that belie any 
claim that the executive has the authority to ignore duly enacted laws.203 First, Article 
II, Section 3 declares that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”204 The command to take care that the laws be faithfully executed “is 
a succinct and all-inclusive command through which the Framers sought to prevent 
the Executive from resorting to the panoply of devices employed by English kings 
to evade the will of Parliament.”205 Subject to two exceptions discussed below, the 
executive’s duty is to honor and enforce duly enacted statutes even if he disagrees 
with them. 
Second, the Constitution grants the power of suspension to Congress, not the 
executive.206 Congress holds the authority to suspend laws by passing subsequent 
amendments to the law or revoking the law in whole or in part.207 Even that power, 
however, is expressly limited by the Constitution. Article I, section 9, clause 2 
 ________________________  
 198. Levey & Klukowski, supra note 28, at 389. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(“The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative [of the king] . . . .”). 
 199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 200. ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS 1689. 
 201. Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 872 (1994). 
 202. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 178–79 (1765). 
 203. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; id  art. I, § 9, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 1. 
 204. Id. art II, § 3. 
 205. May, supra note 201, at 873. 
 206. See generally id. (discussing how the text and history of the U.S. Constitution evince an intent by the 
framers to grant power to suspend laws to Congress alone and not to the President). 
 207. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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prohibits Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus.208 There is no 
language in the Constitution limiting a presidential suspension power because the 
President’s duty under the Take Care Clause is to enforce the law, which would be 
directly undermined by any alleged power to suspend the enforcement of laws.209 
The Virginia Constitution, however, also states that “all power of suspending laws, 
or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the representatives of 
the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.”210  
Writing for the United States Circuit Court for the District of New York in 1806, 
Justice William Patterson, who had been a member of the Constitutional Convention 
as a New Jersey delegate, rejected the argument that the President had the authority 
to suspend laws.211 The law: 
imparts no dispensing power to the president. Does the constitution 
give it? Far from it, for it explicitly directs that he shall “take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.” . . . True, a nolle prosequi may 
be entered, a pardon may be granted; but these presume criminality, 
presume guilt, presume amenability to judicial investigation and 
punishment, which are very different from a power to dispense with 
the law.212 
The refusal to defend a constitutional amendment and duly enacted civil law seems 
tantamount to suspending the enforcement of specific laws.213 
Third, to permit the executive to suspend laws is tantamount to the exercise of 
legislative powers, which is reserved to Congress in Article I.214 The Constitution 
specifies that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States.”215 After identifying the specific areas over which Congress has 
authority to legislate, Article I, Section 9 confers authority to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”216 
Article II, in contrast, which specifies the powers of the executive branch, contains 
no authority to make any laws.217 It confers powers concerning treaty-making, 
appointments of certain officials, granting of pardons, his role as commander-in-
chief of the Army and Navy, and the power to convene or adjourn Congress under 
certain circumstances.218 The President’s only delegated authority with respect to 
 ________________________  
 208. See id. § 9, cl. 2. 
 209. See id. art. II, § 3. 
 210. VA. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 211. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229 (Cir. Ct. D.N.Y. 1806). 
 212. Id. at 1129–30. 
 213. See Zoeller, supra note 173, at 531–32 (discussing the Founders’ rejection of the English King’s absolute 
prerogative to suspend or dispose of laws). 
 214. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I (granting legislative powers to the Congress). 
 215. Id. § 1. 
 216. Id. § 9. 
 217. Id. art. II (granting no law-making authority to the executive). 
 218. See id. §§ 2–3. 
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lawmaking is his ability to veto laws, which veto can be overridden by Congress,219 
and his duty to faithfully execute the laws.220 
In addition, the records of the constitutional debates demonstrate that the drafters 
specifically rejected giving the President an absolute veto power over proposed 
legislation.221 James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, and George Read proposed plans 
for an executive who would possess an absolute veto.222 Mr. Wilson’s proposal was 
unanimously defeated by the Committee of the Whole; Mr. Hamilton’s did not even 
make it to a vote; and Mr. Read’s proposal was defeated nine to one.223  
In fact, even the qualified veto given to the President generated debate.224 One 
of the last changes made to the proposed Constitution was to make it easier to 
override a presidential veto.225 The Convention reduced the majority vote needed 
from three-fourths to two-thirds.226 Some delegates were concerned that the three-
fourths requirement “put too much in the power of the President.”227 At one point, 
the delegates voted on a proposal to give the President the power to suspend any law 
for a specified period of time.228 The proposal was rejected by all the states.229 The 
history of the Constitutional Convention has led one author to conclude that the 
President never has the authority to refuse to enforce a law, even if it is patently 
unconstitutional or plainly encroaches upon the executive’s constitutionally 
delegated authority.230 
2. Prosecutorial Discretion Does Not Confer the Power to Refuse to 
Defend 
One argument that has been advanced in support of an attorney general who 
refuses to defend a law based on personal beliefs of unconstitutionality is 
prosecutorial discretion.231 To suggest, however, that the public official charged with 
upholding the laws of a state can refuse to defend a law when challenged in court, as 
distinct from refusal to enforce in a particular case, based on prosecutorial discretion, 
is to undermine the delicate balance of separation of powers.  
 ________________________  
 219. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 220. Id. § 3. 
 221. May, supra note 201, at 876. 
 222. Id. (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98–103, 200, 292 (Max Farrand 
ed. 1966)). 
 223. Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 222, at 98–103, 200, 292). 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 220, at 585–87). 
 226. Id.  
 227. May, supra note 201, at 876–77 (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra 
note 222, at 585). 
 228. Id. at 877 (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 222, at 103–04). 
 229. Id.  
 230. See id. at 877–78. 
 231. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Refusing to Defend Unjust Laws: Prosecutorial Discretion or 
Prosecutorial Nullification?, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014, 6:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
bennett-l-gershman/refusing-to-defend-unjust_b_4869212.html. 
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The roots of prosecutorial discretion extend back to before the birth of our 
nation.232 In many ways the colonists imitated legal systems with which they were 
most familiar.233 In England, even though there was not a public prosecutor who 
routinely controlled criminal prosecutions, the English attorney general did possess 
the ability to dismiss an ongoing prosecution with a device called the nolle 
prosequi.234 The theory of prosecutorial discretion, as interpreted in federal case law, 
has undergone incremental changes over time.235 An analysis of these changes 
suggests that “the nolle prosequi’s royal origins facilitated the development of the 
notion that criminal prosecution is an unreviewable executive function.”236 These 
early roots help to explain and justify the contemporary theory of this discretionary 
authority.237  
The theory of prosecutorial discretion, as justified by the separation of powers 
doctrine, is also linked to the Take Care Clause.238 Executive power is vested in the 
President of the United States, who is in turn required to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . .”239 This constitutional provision “requires the President to 
enforce the laws of the United States.”240 One scholar has stated that this “take care 
duty, the duty to enforce law faithfully, is, in many respects, the most basic 
responsibility the Constitution imposed upon the Chief Executive.”241 This clause 
has now become “the most commonly cited textual support for executive control 
over criminal prosecutions.”242   
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
acknowledged: “[i]t is well established that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
is at the very core of the executive function.”243 The D.C. Circuit also previously 
held that, in the context of prosecutorial discretion, “it is not the function of the 
judiciary to review the exercise of executive discretion whether it be that of the 
President himself or those to whom he has delegated certain of his powers.”244  
 ________________________  
 232. Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 2 (2009). 
 233. Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 659, 674 
(2010) (citing JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 17 (1980)). 
 234. Krauss, supra note 232, at 2. 
 235. Id. at 4, 13–26. 
 236. Id. at 4. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. at 10 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 
superseded, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass’n, 
228 F. Supp. 483, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3; William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the 
Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 484 (1989)).  
 239. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. 
 240. Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 
65 (2015). 
 241. Id. at 65–66 (quoting Joel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary 
Explorations, 43 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 791, 801 (1999)). 
 242. Krauss, supra note 232, at 23 (citing William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers 
and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 484 (1989)). 
 243. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2005), superseded by 438 F.3d 
1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006).   
 244. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated that “as an 
incident of the constitutional separation of powers, . . . the courts are not to interfere 
with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States 
in their control over criminal prosecutions.”245 Additionally, that court declared that 
“[a]lthough as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer of 
the court, he is nevertheless an executive official . . . , and it is as an officer of the 
executive department that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall 
be a prosecution . . . .”246  
In Ponzi v. Fessenden, the Supreme Court recognized that the attorney general 
is “the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in 
protection of the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the 
prosecution of offenses be faithfully executed.”247 Decades later, the Court also 
acknowledged that “[f]or the faithful execution of such laws the President has . . . 
wide discretion as to method vested in him by the Constitution for the purpose of 
executing the laws.”248 Thus, the duty to “take care” to enforce the laws does allow 
for some necessary discretion in how executive officers choose to enforce them.  
While prosecutorial discretion is often now thought of as nearly absolute and 
unreviewable, the Supreme Court has articulated that prosecutors are limited by 
“fundamental conceptions of justice.”249 The Court stated that a “prosecutor may in 
some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to 
prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence may exist which would support a 
conviction.”250 The Court cited factors that prosecutors may properly consider in 
exercising discretion, including:  
(i) the prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact 
guilty; (ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense; (iii) the 
disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the 
particular offense or the offender; (iv) possible improper motives of 
a complainant; (v) reluctance of the victim to testify; (vi) 
cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of 
others; (vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another 
jurisdiction.251 
In making a decision not to file charges in a criminal case, the Supreme Court has 
also stated that a prosecutor is to determine whether the prosecution would be in the 
 ________________________  
 245. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922). 
 248. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 695 (1952). 
 249. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790–91 (1977) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 
(1935)). 
 250. Id. at 794 n.15 (quoting ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION § 3.9(b) (App. Draft 1971)). 
 251. Id. 
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public’s interest.252 In another case, the Supreme Court further acknowledged that 
“[a]lthough prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not ‘unfettered.’ Selectivity in the 
enforcement of criminal laws is . . . subject to constitutional constraints.”253 
Therefore, there are limits and guidelines to a prosecutor’s exercise of discretion. 
Even with the limits, however, in practice the nature of that discretion remains far-
reaching in scope.254 The few legal constraints that do “exist stem from other areas 
of law—equal protection and due process—and these constraints rarely lead to 
successful prosecutorial misconduct claims.”255  
While prosecutorial discretion is perhaps most often thought of in the criminal 
law context, it functions in the civil realm of the American legal system as well.256 
Courts acknowledge that this powerful tool is applicable in civil, administrative 
settings as it is in criminal law.257 The Supreme Court has stated, for example, “that 
an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal 
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”258 In 
doing so, the Court cited to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) and also remarked that this 
acknowledgment of discretion was “attributable in no small part to the general 
unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.”259 The 
Court analogized between an agency’s refusal to initiate proceedings and a 
prosecutor in the executive branch’s decision not to indict by stating that both share 
similar characteristics.260 Furthermore, the Court recognized that a decision of the 
prosecutor not to indict is “a decision which has long been regarded as the special 
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by 
the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”261 
Looking back to the founding of our nation, it is clear that the Framers’ “constant 
aim [was] to divide and arrange the several offices [of government] in such a manner 
as that each may be a check on the other.”262 Danger of violating this delicate system 
of checks and balances can arise in the area of prosecutorial discretion since “the 
other branches of government provide almost no check on prosecutorial powers.”263 
The more the nature of this discretionary authority broadens, the greater the risk 
becomes. To permit an attorney general to rely on prosecutorial discretion to refuse 
 ________________________  
 252. See id. at 784 (citing United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1988); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 
1 (1890); Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147 (1921)). 
 253. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 
125 (1979)). 
 254. See Krauss, supra note 232, at 4. 
 255. Id. (citing Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing 
Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1997)). 
 256. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r of INS, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 3 (Nov. 17, 
2000), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-
Meissner-11-7-00. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 
(1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Confiscation 
Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869)). 
 259. Id. at 831. 
 260. Id. at 832. 
 261. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 262. Krauss, supra note 232, at 11 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison)). 
 263. Id.  
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to defend a duly enacted law or constitutional amendment when one is challenged in 
court broadens the authority beyond any previously recognized limits. 
B. Attorney General Herring’s Reasons for the Refusal to Defend 
When Attorney General Herring decided that his office would no longer defend 
the constitutionality of the state marriage amendment, it represented a change in 
litigation stance from his predecessor.264 Thus, the Attorney General filed a 
memorandum with the district court in support of the change.265 In that 
memorandum, Mr. Herring cited four types of precedent to support his decision to 
refuse to defend the amendment.266 He cited the conduct of two prior Virginia 
attorneys general, the longstanding position taken at the federal level that there are 
circumstances under which the United States attorney general could refuse to defend 
a duly enacted law, two United States Supreme Court opinions, and two instances 
where the United States solicitor general had taken the position in court that a law 
was unconstitutional.267 His arguments should be analyzed within the framework of 
the constitutional and statutory obligations imposed upon the attorney general.  
Article V, section 15 of the Virginia Constitution establishes the Office of the 
Attorney General and grants the General Assembly power to specify the attorney 
general’s duties.268 The General Assembly has specified that: 
[a]ll legal service in civil matters for the Commonwealth, the 
Governor, and every state department, institution . . . including the 
conduct of all civil litigation in which any of them are interested, 
shall be rendered and performed by the Attorney General, except as 
provided in this chapter and except for any litigation concerning a 
justice or judge initiated by the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission.269  
Thus, absent an exception, the attorney general is charged with defending the 
Commonwealth in litigation.270 
One of the exceptions to that duty is “[i]f, in the opinion of the Attorney General, 
it is impracticable or uneconomical for such legal service to be rendered by him or 
 ________________________  
 264. See Notice of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey at 1, Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. 
Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 2:13-cv-00395), available at 
http://www.oag.state.va.us/Media%20and%20News%20Releases/News_Releases/Herring/Notice_of_Change_in_
Position_by_Rainey_and_Memorandum_in_Support_%28Bostic_v_Rainey_1-23-2014%29.pdf. 
 265. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 1. 
 266. See id. at 2–5. 
 267. Id.  
 268. VA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 14; id. art. V, § 15. 
 269. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507(A) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 270. See Zoeller, supra note 173, at 524 n.77 (identifying several statements by attorneys general about how 
they understand their duty to defend). 
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one of his assistants,” the Attorney General “may employ special counsel for this 
purpose, whose compensation shall be fixed by the Attorney General.”271  
The governor also has the ability to hire special counsel under certain 
circumstances.272 One of those situations is “where the Attorney General certifies to 
the Governor that it would be improper for the Attorney General’s office to render 
legal services due to a conflict of interests,” or that he is unable to render certain 
legal services.273 The Supreme Court of Virginia has explained that the governor has 
independent authority to certify that the attorney general is unable to render legal 
services due to a conflict of interests so that the governor can then appoint special 
counsel.274  
In Wilder, for example, the Governor Wilder set forth in writing the basis for his 
belief that the attorney general had a conflict of interest that precluded him from 
representing the Virginia Retirement System and that the governor intended to 
appoint special counsel to serve as counsel for the Virginia Retirement System until 
such time as the conflicts ceased.275 The attorney general filed suit seeking a 
declaration that the governor lacked authority to appoint “regular” counsel (as 
distinct from “special” counsel).276 The court held that although the statute prohibits 
appointment of regular counsel for a state agency, the governor’s appointment of 
counsel for the Retirement System constituted “special” counsel as it was “limited 
by objective parameters . . . .”277  
The attorney general also challenged the governor’s conclusion that the attorney 
general was unable to represent the Retirement System due to a conflict of interest.278 
The court afforded wide latitude to the governor’s decision, concluding that his 
decisions were not “arbitrary and capricious.”279 
In his memorandum in support of a change of position, Attorney General Herring 
first cited his predecessor’s refusal to defend a law establishing the Opportunity 
Education Institution.280 The law provided for a statewide school division that would 
take over academically failing local schools.281 The Virginia Constitution, however, 
as long interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia, grants supervision of public 
schools to local school districts.282 The constitution states that “[t]he supervision of 
schools in each school division shall be vested in a school board, to be composed of 
 ________________________  
  271. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507(C) (2015). 
 272. See id. § 2.2-510(4).  
 273. Id. § 2.2-510.2 (emphasis added). One question raised by the statute is whether an attorney general’s 
disagreement with a law, or mere belief of its unconstitutionality, satisfies the conflict of interest or inability to 
render services provisions. Two authors believe that it is insufficient. See John Paul Jones & Afsana Chowdhury, 
Administrative Law, 47 U. RICH L. REV. 7 (Annual Survey 2012) (discussing the Attorney General’s refusal to 
defend a regulation passed by the Virginia Board of Health). 
 274. See Wilder v. Att’y Gen. of Virginia, 439 S.E.2d 398, 401–02 (Va. 1994). 
 275. See id. at 400.  
 276. See id. 
 277. Id. at 402. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See Wilder, 439 S.E.2d at 402. 
 280. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 2. 
 281. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-27.2 (2015). 
 282. See VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7. 
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members selected in the manner, for the term, possessing the qualifications, and to 
the number provided by law.”283 The Supreme Court of Virginia has interpreted the 
constitutional provision to mean that “[n]o statutory enactment can permissibly take 
away from a local school board its fundamental power to supervise its school 
system.”284 As a result, it previously ruled unconstitutional state action that divested 
school boards of authority to decide when school property could be put up for sale,285 
attempted to direct the use of funds derived from school construction bonds,286 
attempted to interfere with the school board’s decision to terminate a teacher,287 or 
otherwise interfered with the authority to run the schools.288   
The 2013 amendments to the Virginia Opportunity Education Act “transferred 
to the Opportunity Educational Institution” supervision of “any school that has been 
denied accreditation . . . .”289 Thus, the then-attorney general concluded that a statute 
transferring supervision of a school away from the local school board to the state 
Opportunity Educational Institution violated the state constitution.290 On June 10, 
2014, in litigation filed by the local school board and the Virginia School Boards 
Association, a Virginia circuit court declared the provision unconstitutional.291 
Attorney General Herring’s memorandum also cited another predecessor who 
had joined an amicus brief in a Colorado Supreme Court case where forty-four state 
attorneys general defended the authority of the Colorado attorney general to seek to 
enjoin the enforcement of a newly-enacted state statute.292  
In that case, the Attorney General of Colorado filed suit to enjoin the 
enforcement of newly enacted legislation that redrew the boundaries of Colorado’s 
seven congressional districts.293 The law intended to supplant a court-ordered 2002 
redistricting plan.294 The attorney general argued that the state constitution limits the 
timeframe and frequency of the general assembly’s authority to redistrict.295 
Specifically, the attorney general stated that the general assembly could only 
redistrict once every ten years, and that it had to occur immediately following the 
federal census.296 In response to the attorney general’s petition, the secretary of state 
filed a petition asking the court to enjoin the attorney general from proceeding with 
the suit against the statute.297 The secretary of state argued that the attorney general 
 ________________________  
 283. Id. 
 284. Russell Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Anderson, 384 S.E.2d 598, 604 (Va. 1989). 
 285. See Howard v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Alleghany Cnty., 122 S.E.2d 891, 893 (Va. 1961). 
 286. See Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Fluvanna Cnty. v. Farrar, 100 S.E.2d 26, 30 (Va. 1957). 
 287. See Russell Cnty. Sch. Bd., 384 S.E.2d at 604. 
 288. See Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959). 
 289. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-27.2(B) (2015). 
 290. See Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Opportunity Educ. Inst., 88 Va. Cir. 317 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014). 
 291. See id. at *6. 
 292. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 2; see also Brief of Thurbert E. Baker, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Davidson v. Salazar, 
No. 03SA147, 2003 WL 23221412 [hereinafter Brief]. 
 293. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Colo. 2003). 
 294. See id. 
 295. See id. at 1225. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See id. 
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had no authority to petition the Supreme Court of Colorado for relief.298 The court 
agreed with the attorney general’s interpretation of the plain text of the 
constitution.299 The amicus brief in which the Virginia attorney general joined stated 
that “the ‘real client’ of the Attorney General is the people of the state . . . .”300 The 
attorneys general explained in the brief that they have a duty to uphold the state 
constitution—whether in the face of a state law that conflicts with the constitution, 
or as against a claim that the state constitution violates the Federal Constitution.301 
Attorney General Herring’s memorandum also cited federal examples to justify 
his refusal to defend Virginia’s marriage amendment, including five opinions by the 
Office of Legal Counsel.302 Each of these opinions, however, addressed the refusal 
to defend or enforce a federal statute that either unconstitutionally encroached upon 
the President’s delegated authority or contradicted the plain language of the 
Constitution.303 These are the two longstanding exceptions to a duty to defend.304  
Two of the five opinions cited by Attorney General Herring discussed the 
general duty of the President to defend and enforce acts of Congress while setting 
forth the longstanding exceptions to that duty.305 One of those two, a 1980 opinion 
(Opinion 4a), which is the earliest of the opinions cited and often cited on the topic 
of the duty to defend and enforce, was drafted in response to a letter from the 
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Limitations of Contracted and Delegated 
Authority.306 Opinion 4a answers eleven questions posed by the Chairman to support 
the Justice Department’s position that there are circumstances when the executive 
branch can deny the validity of acts of Congress.307 Those instances included 
situations where the law unconstitutionally encroached upon the executive’s 
delegated authority or where the law was patently unconstitutional.308 In Opinion 4a, 
the Attorney General also stated that he “concur[red] fully in the view expressed by 
nearly all of my predecessors that when the Attorney General is confronted with such 
a choice, it is almost always the case that he can best discharge the responsibilities 
of his office by defending and enforcing the Act of Congress.”309 
The other opinion (Opinion 18) that generally discussed the executive’s 
authority to refuse to defend or enforce an act of Congress concurred with Opinion 
 ________________________  
 298. See Davidson, 79 P.3d at 1229. 
 299. Id. at 1225. 
 300. Brief, supra note 293, at *6. 
 301. See id. at *9–10. 
 302. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 3–4.  
 303. See id. 
 304. See infra Part IV. 
 305. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 3–4.  
 306. See The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4a 
Op. O.L.C. 55 (1980). 
 307. See id. Nine of the questions asked for specific authority from the English constitutional history, the 
Constitutional Convention, Supreme Court opinions, attorney general opinions, statutory or legislative history, 
scholarly work, ethical pronouncements, or bar association materials to support the Justice Department’s position 
that it could deny the validity of acts of Congress. Id. at 57–62.  
 308. See id. at 59–60. 
 309. Id. at 55. 
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4a.310 Opinion 18 explained that the “President has enhanced responsibility to resist 
unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of the 
Presidency.”311 The assistant attorney general cautioned, however, that the President 
should also “base his decision to comply (or decline to comply) in part on a desire 
to afford the Supreme Court an opportunity to review the constitutional judgment of 
the legislative branch.”312 In other words, the President should attempt to preserve 
justiciability for any suit seeking to challenge the validity of the act where it is 
questionable whether the act is constitutional. 
The other three cited opinions stand for the general proposition that the President 
can refuse to defend or enforce an act of Congress that unconstitutionally encroaches 
upon the President’s constitutionally delegated authority.313 One of those opinions 
(Opinion 8) involved a law that retroactively extended the term of bankruptcy judges 
after their terms had expired, which the attorney general’s office asserted violated 
the Appointments Clause given that the President, not Congress, had authority to 
appoint bankruptcy judges.314 However, Opinion 8 explains that “[i]t is generally 
inconsistent with the Executive’s duty, and contrary to the allocation of legislative 
power to Congress, for the Executive to take actions which have the practical effect 
of nullifying an Act of Congress.”315  
Opinion 8 also reiterated that historically there have been two categories of cases 
where the executive has chosen not to defend an act of Congress.316 The first category 
of cases involved those the executive believes to be so clearly unconstitutional “as 
to be indefensible but which do not trench on separation of powers.”317 The opinion 
characterized that category of cases as “exceedingly rare.”318 The second category 
involves statutes the executive believes “usurp executive authority and therefore 
weaken the President’s constitutional role.”319 
The two other opinions cited (Opinion 16 and Opinion 14) involved acts of 
Congress that encroached upon the President’s authority to control foreign affairs.320 
 ________________________  
 310. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199 (1994) 
[hereinafter Opinion 18]. 
 311. Id. at 201. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 3–4.  
 314. See Recommendation that the Department of Justice Not Defend the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op. O.L.C. 183 (1984) [hereinafter 
Opinion 8]. 
 315. Id. at 194. 
 316. See id.  
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. The opinion indicates in a footnote three prior situations where the executive had refused to execute 
or defend a statute. The first involved a private suit challenging the constitutionality of a federal law that provided 
federal funds for hospitals having separate but equal facilities. The United States intervened and took the position 
that the statute was unconstitutional. The second instance involved former Attorney General Civiletti’s refusal to 
defend the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 and the third instance involved the Attorney General Civiletti’s refusal 
to prosecute an alleged violation of a statute prohibiting the mailing of truthful, non-deceptive advertising regarding 
abortions. Opinion 8, supra note 315, at 194–95 & n.2.  
 319. Id. at 195. 
 320. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 3–4.  
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Opinion 16 addressed a law that prohibited the issuance of two passports to United 
States foreign diplomats despite the fact that those serving in the Middle East needed 
two passports in order to travel freely between Israel and the Arab nations.321 
Opinion 14 addressed an act of Congress that required the President to permit a 
member of Congress to be present at certain foreign negotiations.322 The Attorney 
General’s opinion explained that the law infringed on the President’s exclusive 
authority to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United States abroad.323 Opinion 
14 cited prior United States Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that the 
President held “exclusive authority to represent the United States abroad.”324 Citing 
Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78, the opinion explained the delicate 
balancing required in deciding whether to defend or enforce an act of Congress: 
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that 
every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the 
commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, 
therefore, contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this 
would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that 
the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people 
are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of 
powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but 
what they forbid.325 
Attorney General Herring’s memorandum also cited two United States Supreme 
Court decisions for the proposition that the Supreme Court has implicitly approved 
the President’s power not to enforce an unconstitutional statute.326 In Myers v. United 
States,327 a federal statute provided that postmasters “shall be appointed and may be 
removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . .”328 
Ignoring the law, the President removed a postmaster without the advice and consent 
of the Senate.329 The question presented in the case was whether “under the 
Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of 
 ________________________  
 321. See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 
18 (1992) [hereinafter Opinion 16]. The State Department concluded that the law unconstitutionally intruded upon 
the President’s authority to conduct diplomacy on behalf of the United States as it could interfere with the discretion 
and flexibility needed to send diplomats to different countries. For example, “U.S. officials traveling to the Middle 
East could be expected to face obstacles to their entry to many Arab League countries if their passports reflect travel 
to Israel.” Id. at 25. 
 322. See Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 37–38 (1990) [hereinafter 
Opinion 14]. 
 323. See id. at 44. 
 324. Id. at 39. 
 325. Id. at 47. The Attorney General similarly explained in Opinion 16 that a law that unconstitutionally 
encroached upon the executive’s delegated powers—a law that is passed in contradiction of the Constitution—is not 
a valid law and therefore is not treated as “the supreme Law of the Land.” Opinion 16, supra note 322, at 32. 
 326. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 4. 
 327. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 328. Id. at 107. 
 329. See id. 
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the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”330 In a suit for lost wages, the Supreme Court declared the statute 
unconstitutional as it conflicted with the constitutional grant of exclusive power to 
the President of removing executive officers who have been appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.331  
In Freytag v. Commissioner,332 the Court concluded that the authority Congress 
had granted the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court to appoint special trial 
judges did not transgress the structure of separated powers.333 The Court engaged in 
a lengthy discussion about the original intent behind the separation of powers, how 
the separation of powers had built into it the ability of one branch to prevent 
encroachment by another branch, and the scope of the federal appointment power.334 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia explained that to prevent against legislative 
encroachments upon the executive branch’s delegated power, the President had the 
authority to veto laws “or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional.”335 
Finally, the memorandum cited two instances where solicitor generals had filed 
briefs as amicus curiae arguing that a particular law was unconstitutional.336 In one 
case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,337 the Solicitor General took the position that 
the “minority distress sale policy, which permits certain licenses to be transferred 
only to minority-controlled firms, violate[d] the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment.”338 The solicitor general argued that the law would not withstand 
the strict scrutiny standard.339 In that case, the Federal Communications Commission 
was represented by its own general counsel.340 The second case mentioned by 
Attorney General Herring was Buckley v. Valeo.341  However, in that case, the then-
solicitor general filed a brief defending the constitutionality of the election laws on 
behalf of the Federal Elections Commission but then joined a portion of an amicus 
curiae brief that “addresses the problem of the scope of the Federal Election 
Commissioner’s powers, which apparently trench on authority reserved to the 
Executive by Article II of the Constitution.”342 As discussed below, the positions 
 ________________________  
 330. Id. at 106. 
 331. See id. at 176. 
 332. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 333. See id. at 870. 
 334. See id. at 870–92. 
 335. Id. at 906 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 336. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 4. 
 337. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).  
 338. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc., 
Astroline Commc’ns Co. v. Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc., 493 U.S. 1018 (1990) (No. 89-700), 1989 WL 
1127048 at *11. 
 339. See id. at *14. 
 340. See id. at *29. The FCC’s website explains that “The Office of General Counsel of the Federal 
Communications Commission serves as the chief legal advisor to the Commission and its various bureaus and 
offices. The Office of General Counsel also represents the Commission in litigation . . . .” See Office of General 
Counsel, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/office-general-counsel (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
 341. See Memorandum in Support of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, supra note 
124, at 4. 
 342. Brief of the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 412237, at *2. 
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taken by the solicitors general in Metro and Buckley, if taken by a state attorney 
general, would be inappropriate in Metro but appropriate in the Buckley case. 
Significantly, in Metro the solicitor general refused to enforce based on his 
interpretation of the Constitution, whereas in Buckley the law entrenched upon the 
expressly delegated authority of the President.343 The Supreme Court agreed with the 
solicitor general’s position and declared those portions of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act unconstitutional.344 
III. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN A SUBJECTIVE TEST OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
Although attorneys general are vested with discretion in handling litigation, the 
attorney general is ultimately a civil servant. That duty as a civil servant translates 
into an expectation that the attorney general will defend duly enacted laws. When an 
attorney general refuses to defend the laws based on a subjective belief or preference, 
the rule of law is undermined because it injects instability, unpredictability, and 
subjectivity into the governing process. The refusal to defend essentially confers 
upon the attorney general an absolute veto power over the legislative process. The 
attorney general’s refusal to defend, or worse, his active litigation against, the 
constitutionality of duly enacted laws, undermines the public confidence in the 
integrity of the office as it becomes just another political player when the public 
expects more of a detached neutral. 
The United States is described as a “rule of law” system.345 It is a phrase “often 
used but difficult to define.”346 The “rule of law” is frequently described as a 
government of laws, not of men.347 That understanding is consistent with Samuel 
Rutherford’s 1644 work entitled Lex, Rex – The Law and the Prince, which 
articulated the governmental philosophy that the “law is king” as compared to the 
king as the law.348 The Magna Carta is often cited as a significant victory for the 
“rule of law” because King John acknowledged in writing that he was subject to the 
law.349  
The most recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines the “rule of law” as 
the “supremacy of regular as opposed to arbitrary power” and includes the idea “that 
 ________________________  
 343. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, 
Inc., supra note 339, at *2; Brief of the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 343, at *107–120. 
 344. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976). 
 345. See, e.g., Douglas McElvy, No Greater Gift, 66 ALA. LAW. 252, 252 (2005) (“If you paint a portrait of 
America’s national character, the Rule of Law would be a dominant image.”). 
 346. Part I: What is the Rule of Law, in Dialogue on the Rule of Law 4, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf 
[hereinafter ABA Paper]. 
 347. See James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional Principles of 
American Government 282 (3d ed. 2000), available at http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/679/McClellan_0088_
EBk_v6.0.pdf. 
 348. See McElvy, supra note 346, at 253. See also McClellan, supra note 348, at 284 (“Under God, said the 
exponents of the rule of law, the law governs us; it is not by mere men that we ought to be governed; we can appeal 
from the whims and vagaries of human rulers to the unchanging law.”). 
 349. See McElvy, supra note 346, at 252. See also HERMAN BELZ, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF 
LAW IN AMERICA (2009). 
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every person is subject to the ordinary law within the jurisdiction.”350 The sixth 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary stated it slightly differently as “the supremacy of 
law; provides that decisions should be made by application of known principles or 
laws without the intervention of discretion in their application.”351 One author 
characterized it this way: 
In essence, rule of law refers to having rules that are established, 
known, accepted, and respected—by both government and non-
government actors. Rule of law invokes a predictable legal system 
with fair, transparent, and effective judicial institutions to protect 
citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts. 
Rule of law also implies a set of procedures and processes for the 
resolution of disputes that are accessible and fair to all.352  
The American Bar Association Division for Public Education has published 
materials discussing the meaning of the rule of law.353 Key aspects of the discussion 
paper included the following ideas: 
 “no one person is able to gain absolute power and stand above 
the law”;354 
 “a person’s fate should not be in the hands of a single 
individual”;355 
 the need in a republican form of government for respect of the 
laws;356 
 that chaos ensues when every individual is free to determine for 
himself what is law;357 
 that “the laws must not be arbitrary”;358 
 the rule of law is “intended to promote stability”;359 and 
 ________________________  
 350. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009). 
 351. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990). See also McClellan, supra note 348, at 283 (“The test 
is not what the rule is called, but whether the rule is general, known, and certain.”). 
 352. Sidney B. Brooks, Building Blocks for a Rule of Law, 36-DEC Colo. Law. 19, 19–20 (2007). 
 353. ABA Paper, supra note 347, at 4. 
 354. Id. See also Stacy Pepper, The Defenseless Marriage Act: The Legitimacy of President Obama’s Refusal 
to Defend DOMA § 3, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12 (2013) (recognizing that “a President free to disregard the 
will of the Court and Congress is dangerously tantamount to a king.”). 
 355. ABA Paper, supra note 347, at 4. See also Trott, supra note 187, at 35 (2003) (“[T]he Founders made it 
crystal clear in drafting our Constitution that our government would be with the consent of the governed, and that 
we would be guided not by the whim of self-anointed leaders, but by the rule of law.”). 
 356. See ABA Paper, supra note 347, at 5 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton is quoted as stating that “[i]t is very 
important in a republic, that the people should respect the laws, for if we throw them to the winds, what becomes of 
civil government?”). 
 357. Id. (U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter is quoted as stating that “[i]f one man can be allowed 
to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.” United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947)). See also Levey & Klukowski, supra note 28, at 380 (leaving the 
enforcement or defense of laws to the subjective whim of each administration is a “recipe for chaos.”). 
 358. ABA Paper, supra note 347, at 5. The ABA paper quoted U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Diane Wood. See 
Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHIC. L. REV. 455, 457 (2003). 
 359. ABA Paper, supra note 347, at 5. 
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 that “people can expect predictable results from the legal 
system.”360 
The ABA paper also referred to the World Justice Project’s working definition 
of the rule of law as comprising four principles.361 Those principles included “[a] 
system of self-government in which all persons, including the government, are 
accountable under the law” and “[a] system based on fair, publicized, broadly 
understood and stable laws.”362 John Locke similarly explained that:  
[f]reedom of men under government, is, to have a standing rule to 
live by, common to every one of that society . . . a liberty to follow 
my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to 
be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of 
another man.363  
When a government official charged with defending duly enacted laws refuses to do 
so, he puts himself above the law—not subject to it. 
The separation of powers built into the American system is based on a 
foundational premise that governmental authority is necessarily limited.364 Key 
aspects of a limited government are that decision-makers are bound by express and 
certain constitutional standards and restricted to acting within their “delegated 
authority.”365 Writing in the Federalist Papers, James Madison explained that in 
structuring the system of government, the branches must be constructed such that the 
ambition of one branch can counteract the ambition of another.366 He further 
cautioned that “[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary, 
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”367  
The antithesis, then, of a limited government is a “unitary and centralized 
government, or a government in which all the functions or functionaries were 
concentrated in a single office . . . .”368 Such a government would be one “that invited 
despotism and would inevitably become tyrannical and corrupt.”369 Thus, the 
 ________________________  
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 6. 
 362. Id.  
 363. D. Brooks Smith, Promoting the Rule of Law and Respecting the Separation of Powers: The Legitimate 
Role of the American Judiciary Abroad, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES 
OF GOVERNMENT 284 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)). 
 364. See McClellan, supra note 348, at 285 (“[T]he Constitution rested on the proposition that all 
constitutional government is by definition limited government.”). 
 365. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 15 (1988). See also McClellan, 
supra note 348, at 285. 
 366. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 367. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  
 368. McClellan, supra note 348, at 285. 
 369. Id. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) Madison explained the basis of the fear that people 
in power, if left unrestrained and unchecked, would abuse their authority. “If men were angels no government would 
be necessary.” Id. Men (and women) are not angels and, thus, we must “enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” Id. 
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separation of powers that exists in our state and federal governments is a “means to 
certain ends,” which includes “preservation of political liberty . . . .”370 
An attorney general who refuses to fulfill his obligation to defend duly enacted 
laws merges legislative and executive powers in one branch or individual. That 
encroachment into the legislative function by an executive officer thus threatens our 
liberties by ignoring the separation of powers and eroding the rule of law. The threat 
is magnified if no one else has standing to defend the laws that an attorney general 
has refused to defend.  
As Hollingsworth demonstrates, even if state law grants standing for parties to 
intervene to defend the law, the federal courts might conclude that state standing 
rules are insufficient to confer Article III standing.371 Thus, as happened in the 
California litigation, the state defendants refused to defend, and the amendment’s 
proponents were granted intervention to defend, the amendment.372 When the court 
declared the amendment unconstitutional, no one except the intervenors attempted 
to appeal.373 The Supreme Court of the United States eventually held that they lacked 
Article III standing and, as a result, the Ninth Circuit decision was vacated— leaving 
only a trial court opinion that arose from litigation where the state failed to defend 
its duly enacted laws and constitutional amendment.374 After Hollingsworth, a 
federal court might simply deny a request to intervene, leave no one to defend the 
laws, and then declare laws unconstitutional by default.375  
The federal-state conflict in Alabama, discussed earlier, highlights how vital it 
is to jealously guard against governmental overreaching outside its delegated sphere 
of authority. The brief submitted on behalf of the relators in the Alabama case 
discussed the importance of, and judicial precedent for, a state’s refusal to 
independently determine the meaning of the United States Constitution.376 In a 
seminal case involving the Fugitive Slave Act, the Supreme Court of Washington 
declared the Act unconstitutional, which led to freeing a captured slave.377 Writing 
for the court, Justice Smith explained: 
 ________________________  
 370. Matheson, supra note 187, at 6. Another important component of limited government is that there are 
limits on government even when they are acting within their delegated sphere because all law is subject to a higher 
law. LUTZ, supra note 366, at 15. For example, the Declaration of Independence recognizes that certain rights are 
inalienable and thus cannot be taken away by government. Id. Martin Luther King, Jr., in his Letter from the 
Birmingham Jail echoed this same truth when he stated that “there are two types of laws: There are just and there 
are unjust laws.” Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, (Apr. 16, 1963), available at 
http://www.nlnrac.org/american/american-civil-rights-movements/primary-source-documents/letter-form-a-
birmingham-jail. He explained that a “just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of 
God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law.” Id. 
 371. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 372. Id. at 2659. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id.  
 375. Hollingsworth did indicate that where a state statute authorized state officials other than the attorney 
general to represent the state in federal litigation, then those officials would have Article III standing. It also 
indicated, however, that when those state officials became private parties, they no longer had Article III standing to 
represent the state’s interest in defending a duly enacted law. Id. at 2664–65. 
 376. Relators Alabama Policy Institute and Alabama Citizens Action Program’s Brief Addressing the Effect 
of Obergefell on this Court’s Existing Orders, Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst. v. King, No. 1140460, 2015 
WL 1036064 (Ala. Mar. 10, 2015).  
 377. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 157, 160 (1854). 
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But believing as I do, that every state officer who is required to take 
an oath to support the constitution of the United States as well as of 
his own state, was designedly placed by the federal constitution 
itself as a sentinel to guard the outposts as well as the citadel of the 
great principles and rights which it has intended to declare, secure 
and perpetuate, I cannot shrink from the discharge of the duty now 
devolved upon me. . . . I believe most sincerely and solemnly that 
the last hope of free, representative and responsible government 
rests upon the state sovereignties and fidelity of state officers to their 
double allegiance, to the state and federal government; and so 
believing, I cannot hesitate in performing a clear, an indispensable 
duty. . . . Our system of government is two fold, and so is our 
allegiance. . . . To yield a cheerful acquiescence in, and support to 
every power constitutionally exercised by the federal government, 
is the sworn duty of every state officer; but it is equally the duty to 
interpose a resistance, to the extent of his power, to every 
assumption of power on the part of the general government, which 
is not expressly granted or necessarily implied in the federal 
constitution.378  
In a subsequent appeal in the same case, Justice Smith again wrote for the court, 
explaining that “[i]t is much safer to resist unauthorized and unconstitutional power, 
at its very commencement, when it can be done by constitutional means, than to wait 
until the evil is so deeply and firmly rooted that the only remedy is revolution.”379 
The Founders did not envision that states would so readily permit federal 
encroachment upon the authority delegated by the people to the state.380 In fact, in 
Federalist No. 46, Madison stated that there was no fear that the people would 
become too attached to the federal government because “it is only within a certain 
sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously 
administered.”381 He actually called state officials “traitors” who would permit such 
encroachment.382 
An attorney general who refuses to defend a law because she personally believes 
it is unconstitutional ignores the important role that each constitutional officer at 
every level of government plays in preserving our liberties by ensuring that each 
branch is restrained to act only within its delegated authority. 
Addressing the refusal of fellow attorneys general to defend their states’ 
marriage laws, Colorado Attorney General John Suthers aptly described the negative 
impact on the respect for the legal system that results from their refusal to defend 
 ________________________  
 378. Relators Alabama Policy Institute and Alabama Citizens Action Program’s Brief Addressing the Effect 
of Obergefell on this Court’s Existing Orders, supra note 377, at 21–22 (quoting In re Booth, 3 Wis. at 122–23 
(1854)) (sic) (emphasis added). 
 379. In re Booth, 3 Wis. at 201 n.1. 
 380. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison). 
 381. Id.  
 382. Id. 
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laws duly enacted through the political process.383 He referred to the refusal of an 
attorney general to defend the laws as a “litigation veto.”384 “It appears that some 
attorneys general are wielding the litigation veto for the same reasons a governor 
might wield a constitutional veto: They strongly disagree with the law. But in 
contrast to the president or a governor, there is no constitutional authority for this 
litigation veto.”385 An attorney general is a member of the executive branch but does 
not yield the veto power held by the Chief Executive.386  
He explained the natural temptation to use one’s official power to garner support 
from a political base for future political aspirations, which, in the short term, may 
seem “a terrific thing.”387 But, “in the longer term, this practice corrodes our system 
of checks and balances, public belief in the power of democracy and ultimately the 
moral and legal authority on which attorneys general must depend.”388 The ends 
simply do not justify the means. Nor do we want a system of law that is dictated by 
the maxim that “might makes right.” Attorney General Suthers explained that when 
attorneys general refuse to defend laws they are:  
viewed as simply one more player in a political system rather than 
as legal authorities in a legal system. . . . It can be hard to resist the 
urge to effectively purge from the books a law one finds unwise and 
possibly unjust. My hope, though, is that my colleagues will 
recognize that our system of divided power – however messy, 
frustrating or imperfect – is more important than any particular law 
it may produce.389 
Attorney General Suthers understands, as our founders did, that jealously preserving 
the separation of powers is vital to preserving the rule of law and our liberties. 
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE THAT RESPECTS THE RULE OF LAW 
Although most of the scholarship has focused on whether a federal executive has 
the authority to refuse to defend or enforce a law, the same separation-of-powers 
principles are implicated at the state level. Although each branch has the 
responsibility to interpret the Constitution,390 the tension arises in what steps one 
branch can take when a state law, action, or ruling is considered unconstitutional.  
 ________________________  
 383. John Suthers, Suthers: A ‘Veto’ Attorneys General Shouldn’t Wield, PILOTONLINE (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://hamptonroads.com/2014/02/suthers-veto-attorneys-general-shouldnt-wield.  
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 7, cl. 1. 
 387. Suthers, supra note 384. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. Speaking directly to the marriage question, Attorney General Suthers added that “[o]ne must be 
cynical when an attorney general refuses to defend a controversial law as ‘clearly unconstitutional’ when there is no 
binding precedent and it is apparent to most knowledgeable people that the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to decide 
the case on a 5-4 vote.” Id. 
 390. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law 
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994–1995) (“The power to interpret law is not the sole province of the judiciary; rather, 
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The starting point to determine the scope of each branch’s authority should be 
the text of the relevant constitution. The U.S. Constitution and most, if not all, state 
constitutions specify the branches of government and then delegate specific powers 
to each.391 Turning first to the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution grants each branch 
a specific authority to act as a check against unconstitutional acts of a coordinate 
branch.392 Congress is given authority to impeach the President or members of the 
federal judiciary393 or effectively overrule the judiciary by enacting legislation that 
undermines a judicial opinion.394 The President has the authority to check Congress 
by vetoing a bill.395 The judiciary’s powers are simply described in the Constitution 
as being vested with the “judicial Power . . . .”396 Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 
No. 78, described the power of the judiciary as ascertaining the meaning of the 
constitutional provision or legislative act in question.397 He explained, however, that 
the judiciary is to treat the Constitution as fundamental law and not resort to 
“substitut[ing] their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the 
legislature.”398 The same three-branch structure is replicated in virtually all states.399 
A difficult balancing act exists when an executive who is tasked only with executing 
duly enacted laws believes a law is unconstitutional. Does the executive—whether a 
president, governor, or attorney general—possess the authority to refuse to enforce 
or defend the law?  
A. The Historical Grounds for Refusing to Enforce or Defend 
Historically, there have been two, recognized exceptions to the duty to defend 
and enforce: when the law unconstitutionally encroaches upon the power of the 
executive or when the law is patently unconstitutional based on the text of the 
Constitution.400 Each is “premised on the assumed, understood duty of the attorney 
general to defend and enforce because the separation of powers requires it.”401 In 
 ________________________  
it is a divided, shared power not delegated to any one branch but ancillary to the functions of all of them within the 
spheres of their enumerated powers.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (stating with respect to the 
executive and judicial branches that “[t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their 
common commission, none of them, it is evidence, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the 
boundaries between their respective powers.”). 
 391. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1; KY. CONST. § 
27; MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 1, § 1; MO. CONST. art. II, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1; N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 1.  
 392. U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. III. 
 393. Id. art. I, § 3; id. art. II, § 4; id. art. III, § 1. 
 394. Id. art. 1, § 1 (stating Congress is delegated all legislative powers without a limitation that it be bound 
by a prior opinion). 
 395. Id. § 7. 
 396. Id. art. III, § 1. 
 397. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 398. Id. 
 399. See Matheson supra note 187, at 6. 
 400. Levey & Klukowski, supra note 28, at 407. 
 401. See id. at 391 (explaining that the tension of the President’s duty pursuant to the Take Care Clause and 
his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution is best balanced by defending a law unless it is clearly 
unconstitutional). 
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those circumstances, the exceptions would be “‘exceedingly rare.’”402 As discussed 
earlier, there are unique issues presented as a result of an attorney general who is 
tasked with representing the state in civil litigation but refuses to defend a 
constitutional attack on a statute or amendment. 
1. The President or Governor Can Refuse to Enforce a Law That 
Unconstitutionally Encroaches upon the Executive’s Constitutionally 
Delegated Authority 
When a legislative act unconstitutionally encroaches on the constitutionally 
delegated authority of the executive branch, the executive can refuse to enforce it.403 
Former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase offered a 
rationale for the exception: 
Nothing is clearer to my mind than that acts of Congress not 
warranted by the Constitution are not laws. In case a law believed 
by the President to be unwarranted is passed, notwithstanding his 
veto, by the required two-thirds majority, it seems to me that it is his 
duty to execute it precisely as if he held it to be constitutional, except 
in the case where it directly attacks and impairs the Executive power 
confident to him by the Constitution.404 
As discussed above, United States attorneys’ general opinions have consistently 
taken this position. In Opinion 8, the attorney general opined that the retroactive 
extension of the term of bankruptcy judges after their terms had expired violated the 
Appointments Clause because the President, not Congress, had authority to appoint 
bankruptcy judges.405 Opinion 16 involved a law that prohibited the issuance of two 
passports to United States foreign diplomats despite the fact that those serving in the 
Middle East needed two passports in order to travel freely between Israel and the 
Arab nations.406 Opinion 14 addressed an act of Congress that required the President 
to permit a member of Congress to be present at certain foreign negotiations.407 The 
Attorney General’s opinion explained that the law infringed on the President’s 
exclusive authority to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United States abroad.408  
In Myers and Freytag, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the 
President’s authority to refuse to enforce (or comply with) laws that 
unconstitutionally encroach upon the President’s power.409 In Myers,410 the Supreme 
 ________________________  
 402. Id. at 411 (quoting Recommendation that the Department of Justice not Defend the Constitutionality of 
Certain Provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments & Fed Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op. O.L.C. 183, 194 (1984)). 
 403. John E. Beerbower, Ex parte McCardle and the Attorney General’s Duty to Defend Acts of Congress, 47 
U.S.F. L. REV. 647, 678 (2013). 
 404. JACOB W. SHUCKERS, THE LIFE SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 577 (1874). 
 405. See supra notes 315–20 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 407. See Opinion 14, supra note 323. 
 408. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 409. See cases cited supra notes 328–336 and accompanying text. 
 410. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
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Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute prohibiting presidential removal of 
postmasters without the advice and consent of the Senate.411 In Freytag,412 the Court 
upheld a statute granting the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court authority to 
appoint special trial judges but affirmed the ability of one branch to prevent 
encroachment by another branch.413 
2. The Executive Can Refuse to Enforce a Law That Is Patently 
Unconstitutional 
An executive also can refuse to enforce a law when it is patently 
unconstitutional.414 As recent as 1976:  
the top Justice Department officials described what laws fell into the 
second exception using language such as “transparently invalid;” 
“so patently unconstitutional that it cannot be defended;” “so clearly 
unconstitutional as to be indefensible;” “the most blatantly 
unconstitutional;” “prior precedent overwhelmingly indicates that 
the statute is valid;” and “statutes whose constitutionality has been 
undermined by Supreme Court decisions.”415  
Patent unconstitutionality is not premised, however, solely on the executive’s beliefs 
and interpretations that are not grounded on the actual text of the Constitution or 
prior, controlling precedent. Rather, it should be applied in the same manner as the 
first exception where one branch encroaches on the express, delegated authority of 
another branch. Thus, where the actual text of the Constitution conflicts with the 
enacted law, it is patently unconstitutional. 
In a recent article, Indiana Attorney General Gregory F. Zoeller agreed that the 
patently unconstitutional standard should, in theory, require an attorney general to 
defend laws that the attorney general personally believed were unconstitutional, but 
pointed out that too many are “applying their own independent judgment” or “[a]t 
worst . . . abandoning their duty for purely political reasons.”416 Attorney General 
Zoeller asserts that a Rule 11 exception is stronger and would deter attorneys general 
from refusing to defend based on their personal opinions.417 However, Pennsylvania 
Attorney General Kane refused to defend that state’s marriage laws in 2013, stating 
 ________________________  
 411. Id. at 60. 
 412. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 413. Id. at 906 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 414. Levey & Klukowski, supra note 28, at 410. 
 415. Id. at 412. 
 416. Zoeller, supra note 173, at 549. 
 417. Id. at 549–50. Seth Waxman, former Solicitor General during President Clinton’s administration has 
similarly stated that the “President, acting through his Solicitor General, rejects a law as unconstitutional only when 
no ‘professionally respectable arguments can be made in support of its constitutionality.’” Stacy Pepper, The 
Defenseless Marriage Act: The Legitimacy of President Obama’s Refusal to Defend DOMA § 3, 24 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 12 (2013).  
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that she could not “ethically defend the constitutionality” of them.418 She cited 
Pennsylvania’s Rules of Professional Conduct to support her position that she had 
an “ethical obligation . . . to withdraw from a case in which the lawyer has a 
fundamental disagreement with the client.”419 The fundamental disagreement was 
based on the attorney general’s belief that the marriage laws were “wholly 
unconstitutional.”420 Similarly, the Oregon attorney general would not defend [the 
marriage laws] because she said the law “[could not] withstand a federal 
constitutional challenge under any standard of review.”421 
To the extent an attorney general believes the law is wholly unconstitutional, the 
attorney general could assert that defending the law would violate Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11. Rule 11 states that by submitting a document to the court, an 
attorney or party certifies that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, 
and beliefs . . . the claims . . . are warranted by existing law . . . .”422 When an attorney 
general asserts that a law is wholly unconstitutional and cannot withstand federal 
constitutional challenge under any standard of review, the attorney is asserting that 
there are no claims or arguments to be made under existing laws in defense of the 
law.423 The Rule 11 exception leaves a great deal of room for subjective beliefs of 
unconstitutionality. The patently unconstitutional exception, however, decreases the 
subjectivity to the extent a law must be defended unless it conflicts with the plain 
text of the Constitution—not if it allegedly conflicts with lower court interpretations 
of the text of the Constitution or with a higher court decision that is not directly on 
point. 
One potential criticism of the patently unconstitutional exception is that it does 
not leave room for the coordinate duty of each branch of government to act as an 
independent check on the unconstitutional acts of another branch. There is a natural 
tension between the duty to defend and the duty to independently act as a check 
against unconstitutional actions of coordinate branches. Thus, the duty to defend 
cannot be absolute. The patently unconstitutional standard actually best balances the 
concerns as it curtails subjective determinations of unconstitutionality and limits 
exercise of powers to the text of the Constitution. Although there may be situations 
where it is questionable whether a law violates the plain text of the Constitution, 
most situations will more readily fall at either end of the spectrum. For example, if a 
law were passed stating that the Supreme Court had authority to declare war, there 
would be little doubt that the executive could properly refuse to defend or enforce 
that law because it directly contradicts the plain language of the Constitution.424 
 ________________________  
 418. Joe Wolverton, II, Pennsylvania Attorney General Refuses to Enforce State DOMA Law, NEW AM. (July 
21, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/item/16044-pennsylvania-attorney-general-refuses-to-enforce-
state-doma-law. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Chokshi, supra note 119.  
 422. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 423. Id. 
 424. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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One case of patent unconstitutionality involved Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 
New York City.425 Shortly before the effective date of the Equal Benefits Law, the 
mayor began a declaratory judgment action against the city council, arguing that the 
Equal Benefits Law was preempted by provisions of the New York General 
Municipal Law, New York City Charter, and ERISA.426 The next day, the city 
council filed a petition to direct the mayor to immediately implement and enforce 
the local law that prohibited the city from doing business with certain vendors that 
discriminated in the provision of employment benefits between employees with 
spouses and those with domestic partners.427  
The highest court in New York held that although the Mayor has “a duty to 
implement valid legislation passed by the City Council, whether over his veto or 
not,” he also has a “duty to comply with valid state and federal legislation, including 
state competitive bidding laws and ERISA.428 Where a local law seems to the Mayor 
to conflict with a state or federal one, the Mayor’s obligation is to obey the latter . . 
. .”429 The court agreed with the mayor that the ordinance conflicted with state law 
requiring contracts to be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.430 
An older case from Nebraska presents another situation where the law was 
patently unconstitutional.431 In Van Horn, the board of supervisors refused to act 
pursuant to a recent law on the claim that it was passed in clear violation of the 
constitutional mandate that no bill contain more than one subject.432 The county 
attorney applied for a writ of mandamus directing the board to comply.433 Although 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that the bill did not contain two subjects, 
it rejected the city’s argument that ministerial officers must enforce the law 
regardless of its constitutionality.434 The court, relying on Marbury v. Madison, 
explained that ministerial officers are sworn to uphold the Constitution and are not 
bound to obey an unconstitutional statute.435 The court cautioned, however, that they 
should “exercise the greatest caution on such questions. A doubt as to the validity of 
a statute would not justify them in disregarding it. The peace of the community, the 
orderly conduct of government, require that only in clear cases of unconstitutionality 
should they refuse obedience to legislative acts.”436  
In contrast, when a San Francisco mayor directed his clerks to begin marrying 
same-sex couples contrary to the marriage laws, the Supreme Court of California 
held he lacked the authority to refuse to enforce the law:  
 ________________________  
 425. Council of the City of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 2006). 
 426. Id. at 440. 
 427. Id. at 443. 
 428. Id. at 437. 
 429. Id.  
 430. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437. 
 431. Van Horn v. State ex rel. Abbott, 64 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1895). 
 432. Id. at 366. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. at 372. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Van Horn, 64 N.W. at 372. 
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[G]ranting every public official the authority to disregard a 
ministerial statutory duty on the basis of the official’s opinion that 
the statute is unconstitutional would be fundamentally inconsistent 
with our political system’s commitment to John Adams’ vision of a 
government where official action is determined not by the opinion 
of an individual officeholder – but by the rule of law.437 
One author echoed the court’s sentiment when she explained that:  
[i]n order to refuse to enforce a legislative enactment, the executive 
must be confident that the enactment is invalid based on the plain 
text of the higher law and judicial precedent. . . . If non-enforcement 
based solely on the executive’s own interpretation of higher law 
were allowed, “any semblance of a uniform rule of law quickly 
would disappear . . . .”438 
B. A Practical Approach to the Duty to Defend 
Recognizing the duty of an attorney general to defend duly enacted laws is just 
the starting point for the proper remedy when an attorney general personally 
disagrees with the law, has publically spoken against the law, or refuses to defend it. 
Attorney General Suthers asserts that an attorney general should simply do his job 
and defend the laws—regardless of personal beliefs.439 Unfortunately, given how 
politicized the Office of Attorney General has become, it seems a better preservation 
of the rule of law to ensure a zealous defense of the law by someone who desires to 
defend the challenged statute or constitutional amendment. 
The starting presumption in each state should be that an attorney general has a 
duty to defend the constitutionality of duly enacted laws. The duty arises from the 
fact that the attorney general derives its existing powers from the consent of the 
governed and, thus, is a servant of the people.440 
An attorney general can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a duly enacted 
law or amendment where the law is clearly invalid because it either encroaches on 
the expressly delegated powers of another branch or conflicts with the express text 
of the Constitution.441 “Clear invalidity,” however, does not exist absent direct 
conflict with plain and express text of the Constitution, it does not exist where there 
are conflicting judicial rulings, and it does not exist simply because the public 
official disagrees with the law or personally believes it is unconstitutional.  
If an attorney general believes a law is unconstitutional, and therefore cannot or 
will not defend the law, the attorney general can invoke the conflicts-of-interest 
 ________________________  
 437. Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 499 (Cal. 2004).  
 438. Lisa-Beth C. Meletta, Non-Enforcement by a Local Executive: Limitations of Judicial Review and 
Considerations to Restrain the Use of Executive Power, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 511, 539 (2008). 
 439. See Suthers, supra note 384. 
 440. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the attorney general acting as a servant 
of the people.   
 441. See supra Parts IV.A–B for a discussion of the two historical exceptions to the duty to defend. 
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exception. Under those circumstances, there should be in place a statutory provision 
that allows the governor to appoint outside counsel; allows the legislature to appoint 
outside counsel; or permits citizens, as relators, to defend the constitutionality of the 
law.442 To alleviate the concern that a federal court would conclude that relators 
lacked standing under Hollingsworth, the statute would need to define a relator as a 
state official authorized to speak on behalf of the state in federal court for purposes 
of defending duly enacted laws when the attorney general has refused to do so.443 
CONCLUSION 
We are living in times when the maxim “might makes right” is leading interest 
groups to achieve their goals not through the proper legislative channels but through 
unconstitutional encroachments of each branch into the proper sphere of another 
branch. In 1985, Harvard Law Professor Harold Berman lamented the problem with 
that approach:  
The law itself is becoming more fragmented, more subjective, 
geared more to expediency and less to morality, concerned more 
with immediate consequences and less with consistency or 
continuity. The historical soil of Western legal tradition is being 
washed away in the twentieth century, and the tradition itself is 
threatened with collapse.444 
Benjamin Franklin is quoted as saying to a woman he met outside the 
constitutional convention that the Founders had given us a republican form of 
government, if we could keep it.445 We seem to have lost an understanding of the 
important link between separation of powers and protection of liberties. When 
governmental power is accumulated in the hands of one, it becomes arbitrary and 
subjective. We may be willing to dismiss such concerns when we achieve a 
“victory,” justifying the means with the end, but history has proven that absolute 
power corrupts and wields an increasingly uncontrollable power. 
The men who signed the Declaration of Independence knew that freedom from 
tyranny was worth the price of their lives. As a result, the Founders designed a 
structure they believed would best protect its citizens from tyranny; political 
expedience for a desired result should not trample those protections. When attorneys 
general refuse to defend duly enacted laws, they refuse to perform their unique role 
in preserving separation of powers and the rule of law. Given the various and 
 ________________________  
 442. See Beerbower, supra note 404, at 685 (“Any system that allows the Attorney General to refuse to argue 
in defense of an act of Congress necessitates an alternative mechanism by which some party would have standing to 
defend the statute.”); Levey & Klukowski, supra note 28, at 419 (stating the duty to defend “gives the American 
people their day in court . . . .”). 
 443. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664–65 (2013) (suggesting that a state could not authorize 
private parties to represent state interests but that only state officers designated to represent the state interests in 
federal court would have Article III standing). 
 444. Harold J. Berman, The Crisis of Legal Education in America, 26 B.C. L. REV. 347, 351 (1985). 
 445. John F. McManus, “A Republic, if You Can Keep It”, NEW AM. (Nov. 6, 2000), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/7631-a-republic-if-you-can-keep-it. 
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constant encroachments upon power among the branches, it is vital that steps be 
taken to ensure that someone can constitutionally defend laws when the 
constitutional officer charged with doing so refuses to act. 
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